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INTRODUCTION

American law has been persistently unsettled about when corporations should be punished. In particular, American law has been persistently unsettled when answering what I call the food-chain issue:
How high must misbehavior go in a corporate hierarchy before a corporation may be punished? When, if ever, can a corporation legitimately claim that punishment is inappropriate because misbehavior
should be attributed only to an individual employee, and not to the
corporation itself? More specifically, I will look at the food-chain question for criminal mens rea and civil scienter: when should such improper mental states by an employee be imputed to a corporation?'
This article uncovers a schizophrenia regarding the food-chain issue which has not previously been explored. Both criminal law and
the law of punitive damages feature a deep split of authority on the
food-chain issue between states following a broad rule attributing the
mental states of any employee to the corporation and those following a
narrow rule only attributing the mental states of relatively important
employees. Strikingly, the divisions of authority do not match. Many
jurisdictions take different approaches to the food-chain issue in punitive damages and criminal law. More surprisingly, no one has analyzed or assessed this schizophrenia before.
In Part II of this paper, I set out the full menu of approaches that
American jurisdictions take with regard to corporate punishment in
either criminal law or the law of punitive damages. The broad or liberal rule in both fields tracks the traditional respondeat superior
scope-of-employment rule for compensatory damages. Different sorts
1. Because I focus on the attribution of mental states to a corporation, when I discuss criminal law I will focus in this Article on felonies. Many jurisdictions that
adopt a higher standard for imposing criminal liability on corporations follow the
Model Penal Code section 2.07 in adopting a rule more easily allowing the prosecution of corporate misdemeanors, corporate regulatory offenses with no mens rea
element, or corporate omissions. I consider only more serious crimes that involve
actual corporate action and the attribution of malice or other improper mens rea.
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of narrow or restrictive rules, though, set different criteria for exactly
when an employer can escape punishment even though an employee
misbehaved in the scope of his employment.
Part III gives a complete picture of the current food-chain-issue
schizophrenia. Slightly over half of the American jurisdictions (28 of
55, counting federal law, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam,
and the Virgin Islands) take inconsistent positions on corporate crime
and corporate punitive damages. All four possible approaches are well
represented among American jurisdictions. Eleven jurisdictions are
Consistently Liberal; sixteen are Consistently Restrictive; eighteen
follow Liberal Rules for corporate crime but Restrictive Rules for corporate punitive damages, and ten follow Liberal Rules for corporate
punitive damages but Restrictive Rules for corporate crime. A survey
of the literature on corporate punitive damages and corporate crime
reveals that almost no one, either courts or commentators, has given
the issue any attention. This lack of cross-fertilization is particularly
curious because there are many ways in which litigants might profitably point out the current schizophrenia to foster their own cases.
Some litigants in almost all states can profit by pointing out the connections (and inconsistencies) between the resolution of food-chain issues in criminal law and punitive damages.
In Part IV, I consider whether corporate crime and corporate punitive damages should resolve the food-chain issue the same way. I argue that compelling reasons exist to think that criminal law and the
law of punitive damages should apply the same rule to decide when to
punish a corporation. Several distinctions might be offered to explain
the divergence of approaches, but they do not justify it.
II.

TYPES OF FOOD-CHAIN RULES FOR
PUNISHING CORPORATIONS

In both criminal law and the law of punitive damages, some states
follow what I call the Liberal Rule and some other states follow what I
call a Restrictive Rule. The Liberal Rule allows courts to punish a
corporation if any employee misbehaves in the scope of her employment-thereby imputing to a corporation any employee's malice,
knowledge, recklessness or other scienter or mens rea. The Restrictive
Rule allows courts to punish corporations only if relatively high-level
employees (the usual term is a "managerial" or "high managerial" employee) misbehave while acting in the scope of their employmentthereby imputing to a corporation only such high-level employees' scienter or mens rea. Put another way, we might divide employees between more important Big-Cheeses and less important Small-Fries.
The Restrictive Rule punishes corporations only for Big-Cheese misbehavior, but the Liberal Rule punishes corporations for Small-Fry misbehavior too.
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Of the fifty-five jurisdictions I survey, I count a thirty-four to
twenty-one advantage for Restrictive Rules on corporate punitive
damages and a twenty-nine to twenty-six advantage for Liberal Rules
on corporate crime. 2 Therefore, among the 110 rules on corporate
punishment, I count a sixty to fifty advantage for Restrictive Rules.
The Liberal Rules for corporate punishment are relatively simple;
they simply punish corporations for the same conduct that tort law
uses for compensatory damages: the actions of any employee in the
scope of employment. 3 Sometimes the Liberal Rule is therefore called
a "scope-of-employment" rule. 4 However, there are many types of Restrictive Rules, giving different answers to the food-chain question,
"how high in the corporate hierarchy is enough?" The Liberal Rule
requires no special articulation, which a Restrictive Rule would require, of a Big-Cheese/Small-Fry distinction. I assume, therefore, that
states that allow for a type of corporate punishment without specifying a food-chain limit on its availability follow the Liberal Rule.
A.

Liberal Rules

Many courts apply a rule that does not allow a corporation to avoid
punishment by disavowing a low-level employee's mental states. If an
employee is within the scope of his employment, then his mental
states are always imputed to the corporation. If the employee is punishable, so is the corporation.
1.

The FederalRule for Corporate Crime

The Liberal Rule for corporate crime is also known as the "federal"
rule, after its establishment in the New York Central & Hudson case
in 1909 and succeeding cases. 5 The rule holds that a corporation may
be punished for the act of any employee within the scope of his employment, applying the same familiar rules that are applied for compensatory damages. New York Central & Hudson approved a
2. See infra Part IV. Several commentators, apparently following Prosser, see W.
PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 2, at 12-13 (5th ed. 1984),
have claimed that the Liberal Rule for punitive damages is in a slight majority.
See, e.g., Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2616 (2008); In re P & E
Boat Rentals, 872 F.2d 642, 650 (5th Cir. 1989); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY
§ 2.04 cmt. b, § 7.03 cmt. e (2006); David W. Robertson, Punitive Damages in
American Maritime Law, 28 J. MAR. L. & COM. 73, 123 (1997); Philip A. Lacovara
& David P. Nicoli, Vicarious Criminal Liability of Organizations: RICO as an
Example of a Flawed Principle in Practice, 64 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 725, 731 n.41
(1990). If it was true at the time, it is not true today.

3. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF AGENCY § 219(1) (1958); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
AGENCY § 2.04 (2006).

4. See, e.g., Randy S. Parlee, Vicarious Liability for Punitive Damages: Suggested
Changes in the Law through PolicyAnalysis, 68 MARQ. L. REV. 27, 31-36 (1984).
5. N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481 (1909).
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statutory provision that provided for criminal liability regarding the
regulation of the rates of common carriers. The provision provided
that:
The act, omission, or failure of any officer, agent, or other person acting for or
employed by any common carrier, acting within the scope of his employment,
shall, in every case, be also deemed to6 be the act, omission, or failure of such
carrier, as well as that of the person.

The Court explained:
While the law should have regard to the rights of all, and to those of corporations no less than to those of individuals, it cannot shut its eyes to the fact
that the great majority of business transactions in modem times are conducted through these bodies, and particularly that interstate commerce is almost entirely in their hands, and to give them immunity from all punishment
because of the old and exploded doctrine that a corporation cannot commit a
crime would virtually take away the only means of 7effectually controlling the
subject-matter and correcting the abuses aimed at.

The Court quoted Joel Prentiss Bishop's commentary: "If... the invisible, intangible essence or air which we term a corporation can level
mountains, fill up valleys, lay down iron tracks, and run railroad cars
on them, it can intend to do it, and can act therein as well viciously as
8
virtuously."
Subsequent courts following New York Central & Hudson have expanded the scope-of-employment rule to federal crimes in general.
The First Circuit recently explained: "[A] corporation may be held liable for the criminal acts of its agents so long as those agents are acting
within the scope of employment."9 The Supreme Court expounded on
this notion further in 1958:
The business entity cannot be left free to break the law merely because its
owners ... do not personally participate in the infraction. The treasury of the
business may not with impunity obtain the fruits of violations which are committed knowingly by agents of the entity in the scope of their employment.
Thus pressure is brought on those who own the entity to see to it that their
agents abide by the law. 1 0
6. Elkins Act, ch. 708, 32 Stat. 847 (1903) (current version at 49 U.S.C. § 11907
(2000)); see N.Y Cent. & Hudson River, 212 U.S. at 491-92 (quoting the original
language of the Act).
7. N.Y. Cent. & Hudson, 212 U.S. at 495-96.
8. Id. at 493 (quoting 2 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, NEW COMMENTARIES ON THE CRIMINAL LAW UPON A NEW SYSTEM OF LEGAL EXPOSITION § 417, at 255-56 (8th ed.
1892)).
9. United States v. Potter, 463 F.3d 9, 25 (1st Cir. 2006) (citation and quotation
omitted). For more authority similarly expanding on this rule, see United States
v. Singh, 518 F.3d 236, 249 (4th Cir. 2008); United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp.,
467 F.2d 1000, 1004 (9th Cir. 1972); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 307 F.2d
120, 127 (5th Cir. 1962); United States v. George F. Fish, Inc., 154 F.2d 798, 801
(2d Cir. 1946); United States v. Ionia Mgmt. S.A., 526 F. Supp. 2d 319, 323-24 (D.
Conn. 2007); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 8, introductory cmt.
(2007).
10. United States v. A & P Trucking Co., 358 U.S. 121, 126 (1958).
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Cases from fourteen jurisdictions (Federal law, California, the District of Columbia, Florida, Massachusetts, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Vermont, Virginia, and Wisconsin) follow the New York Central &
Hudson Liberal Rule for corporate crime." Statutes adopt the rule in
another four states (Alaska, Indiana, Kansas, and Maine). 12 Another
eleven states (Alabama, Connecticut, Maryland, Mississippi, Nevada,
New Mexico, Oklahoma, Puerto Rico, South Carolina, the Virgin Islands, and Wyoming) allow corporate criminal liability without suggesting any food-chain limit; I therefore presume they follow a Liberal
Rule.13
2.

The Goddard-Mobile Rule for CorporatePunitive Damages

One of the first cases to consider the food-chain issue in detail for
corporate punitive damages and adopt a Liberal Rule was Goddard v.
Grand Trunk Railway from Maine in 1869.14 The Goddard court
made an impassioned defense-Prosser and Keeton call it a "classic
diatribe"15-of corporate punitive damages, resisting any food-chain
limit on their availability. The guilt of any servant acting within the
scope of employment is sufficient for punishing the corporation itself:
"All attempts ... to distinguish between the guilt of the servant and
the guilt of the corporation; or the malice of the servant and the malice
of the corporation; or the punishment of the servant and the punishment of the corporation, is sheer nonsense."1 6 The Liberal Rule for
corporate punitive damages, like the Liberal Rule for corporate crime,
thus follows the same simple standards for punitive damages that tort
law follows for compensatory damages: an employer is liable for actions by an employee in the scope of employment.
11. See infra notes 196 (California), 201 (the District of Columbia), 203 (Florida), 109
(Massachusetts), 111 (Nebraska), 115 (New Hampshire), 222 (North Carolina),
224 (Rhode Island), 226 (South Dakota), 126 (Tennessee), 228 (Vermont), 230
(Virginia), and 234 (Wisconsin).
12. See infra notes 194 (Alaska), 103 (Indiana), 209 (Kansas), and 105 (Maine).
13. See infra notes 101 (Alabama), 199 (Connecticut), 107 (Maryland), 214 (Mississippi), 217 (Nevada), 220 (New Mexico), 119 (Oklahoma), 121 (Puerto Rico), 124
(South Carolina), 232 (Virgin Islands), and 236 (Wyoming).
14. 57 Me. 202, 1869 WL 2230 (1869).
15. KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 2, at 13 n.60 (5th ed. 1984).
16. Goddard, 57 Me. at 223, 1869 WL 2230, at *15 (1869). Judge Tapley dissented at
length from the majority, apparently favoring the abolition of corporate punishment altogether. See, e.g., id. at 235, 247- 48, 1869 WL 2230, at *23, *31. It is
possible that Tapley would allow corporate punitive damages for the actions of a
sufficiently important corporate employee, and that these statements merely reflect what I below call a 5R (Restrictive-Rule Ratification-Requirement Regress)
Problem. See infra subsection II.B.3.
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The Alabama Supreme Court offered another early defense of the
Liberal Rule in its 1893 Mobile & 0. R. Co. v. Seals.17 The court considered and rejected adopting a Restrictive Rule: that is, "the view
taken by some courts of marked ability, namely, that, while corporations cannot be mulcted in punitive damages for the willfulness of
such inferior employees as trainmen, they are responsible in such
damages for the willful misconduct of such general executive officers
as their presidents, general managers, etc."1s The court responded,
"It can no more be said that the corporation has impliedly authorized
or sanctioned the willful wrong of its president, in the accomplishment
of some end within his authority, than that a similar wrong by a
brakeman, to an authorized end, is the wrong of the corporate entity."19 The U.S. Supreme Court briefly considered and rejected a constitutional challenge to Alabama's Liberal Rule for corporate punitive
damages in 1991.20
Cases from fourteen states (Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Georgia,
Indiana, Maine, Maryland, Missouri, Montana, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Tennessee) currently follow the
Goddard-Mobile scope-of-employment rule for corporate punitive
damages under the common law.2 1 I count another seven jurisdictions
as following a Liberal Rule for punitive damages, but with some sort of
caveat:

"

Massachusetts and Louisiana follow Liberal Rules for corporate punitive
damages under
statutes, though they lack punitive damages under the
22
common law.
" Nebraska, Puerto Rico and Washington also lack common law punitive
damages and Nebraska requires punitive awards to go to schools, not
plaintiffs. None of the three has indicated that it imposes any food-chain
limit on statutory
punitive damages, so I presume they follow Liberal
23
Rules for them.
" New Hampshire and Michigan follow Liberal Rules for idiosyncraticallycharacterized punitive damages-New Hampshire calls them "enhanced
compensatory
damages," while Michigan interprets them as non24
punitive.
17. Mobile & 0. R. Co. v. Seals, 13 So. 917 (Ala. 1893).
18. Id. at 919. Lake Shore & Mich. S. Ry. Co. v. Prentice, 147 U.S. 101 (1893), released in January 1893, seems to be the "court[ ] of marked ability" most clearly
in view; Mobile was released in December of the same year.
19. Mobile, 13 So. at 919. For another classic diatribe, see Pullman Palace-CarCo. v.
Lawrence, 22 So. 53, 57-58 (Miss. 1897).
20. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1991).
21. See infra notes 102 (Alabama), 240 (Arizona), 242 (Arkansas), 245 (Georgia), 104
(Indiana), 106 (Maine), 108 (Maryland), 254 (Missouri), 257 (Montana), 120
(Oklahoma), 260 (Oregon), 263 (Pennsylvania), 125 (South Carolina), and 127
(Tennessee).
22. See infra notes 110 (Massachusetts) and 247 (Louisiana).
23. See infra notes 112-14 (Nebraska), 122-23 (Puerto Rico), and 273-74 (Washington).
24. See infra notes 116-18 (New Hampshire) and 250-51 (Michigan).
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3. An Accounting of Liberal Rules
To sum up my conclusions regarding the fifty Liberal Rules, fourteen are presumed (eleven criminal, three punitive damages). Of the
thirty-six explicit Liberal Rules, eighteen relate to corporate crime
(fourteen cases and four statutes) and eighteen relate to corporate punitive damages (fourteen apply to common law punitive damages, two
to statutory punitive damages, and two to idiosyncratically-characterized punitive damages).
B.

Types of Restrictive Rules

While the Liberal Rule follows the same scope-of-employment test
that generally governs compensatory damages, a Restrictive Rule
makes it harder to punish a corporation than to get compensatory
damages, in terms of the importance of the misbehaving employee.
The basic idea is that there can be a rogue employee who is not totally
outside the scope of his employment (so the corporation still has to pay
compensatory damages), but whose actions are sufficiently different
from what usually characterizes the corporation that once the corporation gets rid of that employee, or gets him back in line, the corporation
itself should not be punished. The rogue employee phenomenon is a
bit like an insanity defense for individuals, which prevents punishment 2 5 but not compensatory damages. 26 However, just as with the
insanity defense, there are many different ways to spin out this basic
idea.
1.

The MPC Rule for CorporateCrime

The Restrictive Rule for corporate crime is most prominently featured in section 2.07 of the Model Penal Code (MPG), adopted by the
American Law Institute with the rest of the MPC in 1962. The key
food-chain term is "high managerial agent." For the most serious
crimes, 2 7 corporations can be criminally liable if "the commission of
25. See Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co. v. Saboda, 489 So. 2d 768, 770-71 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1986).
26. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895J cmt. a (1979); Robert M. Ague, Jr.,
The Liability of Insane Persons in Tort Actions, 60 DICK. L. REV. 211, 211 (1956);
Francis H. Bohlen, Liability in Tort of Infants and Insane Persons, 23 MICH. L.
REV. 9, 9 (1924).

27. For more minor crimes, the MPC has three other separate rules for corporate
criminal liability. First, for either minor "violation[s]" or for "a statute . . . in
which a legislative purpose to impose liability on corporations plainly appears,"
the MPC allows liability if "the conduct is performed by an agent of the corporation acting in behalf of the corporation within the scope of his office or employment." MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(1)(a) (1962). However, the MPC provides a
defense if "the high managerial agent having supervisory authority over the subject matter of the offense employed due diligence to prevent its commission," id.
§ 2.07(5). I discuss this rule below in subsection II.B.4. Second, for criminal
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the offense was authorized, requested, commanded, performed or
recklessly tolerated by the board of directors or by a high managerial
agent acting in behalf of the corporation within the scope of his office
28
or employment."
The MPC goes on to define its key food-chain term in terms of policymaking power:
"[High managerial agent" means an officer of a corporation or an unincorporated association, or, in the case of a partnership, a partner, or any other
agent of a corporation or association having duties of such responsibility that
his conduct 2may
fairly be assumed to represent the policy of the corporation or
9
association.

The MPC thus defines "sufficiently-important misbehaving employee
to warrant corporate punishment" as "sufficiently-important employee
to make corporate policy." However, only a few of the states adopting
MPC-like Restrictive Rules adopt its definition of "high managerial
agent." Many of them allow supervision of other employees to count,
and not just policymaking authority, in line with the literal meaning
of "managerial."
MPC-style statutes on corporate criminal liability have been
adopted in twenty jurisdictions; cases from another four follow similar
rules.
*

Five jurisdictions (Arizona, Guam, Kentucky, Pennsylvania, and Texas)
adopt the MPC's
own definition of "high managerial agent" in terms of
30
policymaking.
* Seven states (Colorado, Illinois, Missouri, Montana, New York, Oregon,
and Washington) expand the definition of "high managerial 3agent"
to in1
clude both policymakers and supervisors of other employees.
* Georgia uses the term "managerial official" instead of the MPC's "high
managerial agent,"
defining it in terms of misbehavior by policymakers or
32
supervisors.
" Two states (Iowa and North Dakota) define corporate criminal liability di33
rectly in terms of misbehavior by policymakers or supervisors.
* Four states (Arkansas, Delaware, Hawaii, and Utah) have statutes with
34
no definition of "high managerial agent."

28.

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

omissions, corporations can obviously be punished without any concern for foodchain issues, because no one did what the corporation was required to do. Id.
§ 2.07(1)(b). Third, there is an exception ifa specific statute explains whose misbehavior should count. Id. § 2.07(1)(a).
Id. § 2.07(1)(c). In later quotations from state statutes that follow the MPC, I will
omit their provisions relating to omissions or violations and only quote their
high-managerial-agent provision for the most serious crimes.
Id. § 2.07(4)(c).
See infra notes 238- 39 (Arizona), 138-39 (Guam), 155-56 (Kentucky), 261-62
(Pennsylvania), and 178-79 (Texas).
See infra notes 128-29 (Colorado), 145-46 (Illinois), 252-53 (Missouri), 255-56
(Montana), 163-64 (New York), 258-59 (Oregon), and 264-65 (Washington).
See infra notes 243-44.
See infra notes 151 (Iowa) and 169 (North Dakota).
See infra notes 241 (Arkansas), 133 (Delaware), 141 (Hawaii), and 182 (Utah).
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"

Ohio's statute, discussed in more detail below, adds a due-diligence derule that has been interpreted to apply to misbehavfense to an MPC-style
35
ior by policymakers.
" Cases from four states adopt MPC-like Restrictive Rules for corporate
criminal liability. They apply to misbehavior by supervisors (Michigan),
36
policymakers (Minnesota and Idaho), and "officers" (Louisiana).

2.

The Restatement Rule for Corporate Punitive Damages

The Restrictive Rule for punitive damages is most prominently featured in the Restatements of Torts and Agency. Section 909 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, from 1976, reads:
Punitive damages can properly be awarded against a master or other principal because of an act by an agent if, but only if,
(a) the principal or a managerial agent authorized the doing and the manner of the act, or
(b) the agent was unfit and the principal or a managerial agent was reckless in employing or retaining him, or
(c) the agent was employed in a managerial capacity and was acting in the
scope of employment, or
(d) the principal
or a managerial agent of the principal ratified or ap37
proved the act.
35. See infra subsection II.B.4 and notes 173-74.
36. See infra notes 248-49 (Michigan), 158 (Minnesota), 143 (Idaho), and 246
(Louisiana).
37. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 909 (1979). This basic rule was first adopted
in section 909 of the First Restatement of Torts, from 1939:
Punitive damages can properly be awarded against a master or other
principal because of an act by an agent if, but only if,
(a) the principal authorized the doing and the manner of the act, or
(b) the agent was unfit and the principal was reckless in employing him,
or
(c) the agent was employed in a managerial capacity and was acting in
the scope of employment, or
(d) the employer or a manager of the employer ratified or approved the
act.
Because subsections (a) and (b) deal with a principal's own conduct, and a corporation acts only through an agent, these sections cannot explain fully when a
corporation faces liability. The key standard for our food-chain issue is subsection (c), in particular the phrase "employed in a managerial capacity." Subsection
(d)'s "manager of the employer" is presumably synonymous with this phrase from
(c). This language has been the basis for all of the ALI's later Restrictive Rules.
The first edition of the Restatement ofAgency, completed in 1933, lacked a provision on punitive damages, but section 217C of 1958's second edition copied section 909's provision. The only change was the substitution of "managerial agent
of the principal" in the Restatement of Agency for the Restatement of Torts' "manager of the employer" in (d). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 217C
(1958). The Restatement noted a division of authority, however: "The cases are
divided; some courts impose liability upon a master for unauthorized wanton acts
of servants who are not managers; others do not." Id. cmt. a.
In 1979, the Restatement (Second) of Torts added "or a managerial agent" to
subsections (a) and (b) of section 909, so that the section now reads as quoted
above.
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This revision makes the Restatement's answer to the food-chain issue
(whose misconduct counts?) clear to an extent: the misconduct of
"managerial agents." The Restatement's commentary, however, gives
no more detail on when that standard is met.
Courts dealing with the Restatement's Restrictive Rule commonly
struggle with what "managerial" means. The Restatement (Third) of
Agency states that "there is no rigid test to determine whether an
agent is a 'managerial agent'."38 The Supreme Court, while adopting
the standard for Title VII, noted: "[No good definition of what consti-

The Restatement (Second) of Agency also included a short provision on corporate crime, section 217D. It says only: "A principal may be subject to penalties
enforced under the rules of the criminal law, for acts done by a servant or other
agent." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 217D. Comment a added, "It is not
within the scope of the Restatement of this Subject to state in detail the rules by
which a master or other principal may become subject to a criminal penalty." Id.
§ 217D cmt. a. Comment d noted with respect to offenses requiring criminal intent, "[A]s in the case of punitive damages, an employer may be penalized for the
act of an advisory or managerial person acting in the scope of employment." Id.
§ 217D cmt. d. The Restatement (Third)ofAgency does not include any reference
to section 217D of the second edition.
Comment e from the 2006 Restatement (Third) of Agency endorses the earlier
Restatements' view, while, relatively mildly, noting the division of authority and
commenting that "[tihe approach outlined in § 909 is preferable." RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.03 cmt. e (2006).
38. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.03 cmt. e. The Restatement added, however, these comments that suggest that "managerial agents" are policymakers:
Although there is no rigid test to determine whether an agent is a "managerial agent" for purposes of Restatement (Second) Torts § 909, the determination should focus on the agent's discretion to make decisions that
would have prevented the injury to the plaintiff or that determine policies of the organization relevant to the risk that resulted in the injury.
The title that an agent holds is not dispositive, nor is the fact that the
agent is not among the highest in an organization's hierarchy. If an
agent in fact manages a business or enterprise, the agent is a "managerial agent" of the principal on whose behalf it manages, although the
agent is external to the principal's own organizational structure.
Id. The initial phrase, "the agent's discretion to make decisions that would have
prevented the injury to the plaintiff," seems broader than intended. The injury to
the plaintiff was caused by an employee's misbehavior, and even the most minor
misbehaving employee had the discretion not to misbehave as he did, and therefore "discretion to make decisions that would have prevented the injury to the
plaintiff." (If he lacked such discretion because the misbehavior was required by
those higher in the corporate hierarchy, then such higher employees should be
the focus of inquiry. There is always someone in a corporate hierarchy with discretion not to do or require whatever led to the plaintiffs injury, but the point of
the rule is that punitive damages are not always available against a corporation.). The second phrase, on power to "determine policies of the organization,"
makes much more sense as a definition of "managerial agent."
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tutes a 'managerial capacity' has been found."39 One court called it an
"elusive label." 40
The Model Punitive Damages Act, adopted in 1996 by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, sets aside the
"managerial" concept, substituting "policymaking authority":
If a director, officer, or agent, with policymaking bauthority to bind a legal entity or other principal, is found liable for punitive damages under Section 5 for
an act or omission occurring in the course and within the scope of exercising
the authority on behalf of the4 1entity or principal, the entity or principal is also
liable for punitive damages.

However, the commentary on the Act says that the rule "basically
tracks the American Law Institute Restatements regarding vicarious
2
responsibility for punitive awards."4
Twenty-four jurisdictions apply a Restatement-style rule or a variant to corporate punitive damages. Most of them do not give any significant explanation of exactly who counts as a managerial employee,
though a few do:

"

Three states (Alaska, California, and Minnesota) have adopted Restatement-style statutes. 4 3 California and Minnesota
interpret their statutes
44
in terms of the misbehavior of policymakers.
" Florida and North Carolina have adopted a statute somewhat like the Restatement, allowing corporate punitive damages for the actions of "officers,
directors, or managers." The broadest term, "managers," seems similar to
(and as incompletely-defined as) the Restatement's "managerial agents."
Florida's statute also, however, allows corporate punitive
damages for
45
gross negligence, perhaps even by minor employees.
" Cases from another seventeen jurisdictions (Colorado, Delaware, Guam,
Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Nevada, South
Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virgin Islands, West Virginia, and Wyoming) follow the Restatements. 4 6 Guam, Illinois, New Jersey, and Nevada interpret "managerial agents" as policymakers, though New Jersey
prefers the term "upper management." 4 7 New York says that its rule is
"inessence" that of the Restatement, but uses the term "superior officers,"
39. Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526, 543 (1999) (quoting 2 JAMEs D.
GHIARDI & JOHN

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

47.

J.

KIRCHER, PUNITIVE DAMAGES: LAW AND PRACTICE §

24.05

(1998)). Similar confusion also sometimes exists regarding the Restrictive Rule
for corporate crime, especially when those Restrictive Rules are adopted through
common-law evolution. People v. Lanzo Constr. Co., 726 N.W.2d 746, 753 (Mich.
Ct. App. 2006).
Shoucair v. Brown Univ., 917 A.2d 418, 434 (R.I. 2007).
MODEL PUNITIVE DAMAGEs ACT § 6(c) (1996), available at http://www.law.upenn.
edu/bll/archives/ulc/mpda/MPDAFNAL.pdf.
Id. § 6 commentary (1996).
See infra notes 195 (Alaska), 197 (California), and 158 (Minnesota).
See infra notes 198 (California) and 159 (Minnesota).
See infra notes 205 (Florida) and 227 (North Carolina).
See infra notes 131 (Colorado), 134 (Delaware), 140 (Guam), 144 (Idaho), 147, 149
(Illinois), 152 (Iowa), 218 (Nevada), 221 (New Mexico), 165 (New York), 227
(South Dakota), 181 (Texas), 183 (Utah), 229 (Vermont), 232 (Virgin Islands), 186
(West Virginia), and 237 (Wyoming).
See infra notes 140 (Guam), 149 (Illinois), 162 (New Jersey) and 219 (Nevada).
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defining them as those who have "a high level of general managerial authority" and represent a corporation's "institutional conscience." 4 8
49
" Kansas uses a Restatement-like standard to interpret its statute.
" Federal law for Title VII uses a hybrid of the Restatement's rule with a
50
good-faith defense (discussed in more detail below).

3.

Lake Shore and the Restrictive-Rule RatificationRequirement-Regress (5R) Problem

Prior to the Restatements, the most prominent Restrictive Rule for
corporate punitive damages was an 1893 case from the Supreme
Court under the pre-Erie general federal common law, Lake Shore &
Michigan Southern Railway Co. v. Prentice.51 The Court seemed to
impose a strict requirement that an agent's misbehavior must be ratified by the principal in order to support punishment of the principal:
"A principal, therefore, though of course liable to make compensation
for injuries done by his agent within the scope of his employment, cannot be held liable for exemplary or punitive damages, merely by reason of wanton, oppressive, or malicious intent on the part of the
52
agent."
Lake Shore illustrates one recurrent problem that plagues many
statements of the Restrictive Rule. Many courts, and a few statutes,
say that it is not enough if a low-level employee misbehaves; that misbehavior must be ratified by the corporation (if not specifically authorized in advance). Plainly, such courts reject a Liberal Rule; more is
required for corporate punishment than misbehavior by an employee
in the scope of his employment. However, it is not at all clear what
more is required, because it is not clear who must ratify a low-level
employee's actions to justify corporate punishment. One way to view
the point is to see that someone who himself misbehaves has, of
course, ratified that misbehavior. But if misbehavior by a low-level
employee is not enough to justify punishing a corporation, ratification
by a low-level employee is obviously likewise not enough. And if a
mid-level employee ratifies a low-level employee's misconduct, that
ratification is itself misbehavior that, one might think, does not warrant corporate punishment unless it is ratified. Once we require that
misbehavior be ratified in order to warrant corporate punishment, we
should also apply that rule to the act of improper ratification. But a
regress looms-any act of ratification of the improper ratification
would be misbehavior that must itself be ratified before corporate
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

See infra note 166.
See infra note 211.
See infra subsection II.B.4.
147 U.S. 101 (1893).
Id. at 107.
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punishment would be proper. 53 Thus the Restrictive-Rule Ratification-Requirement-Regress (5R) Problem. The problem does not
plague all statements of the Restrictive Rule, but only Restrictive
Rules with an open-ended requirement of ratification. The Restatement, for instance, avoids the 5R Problem by specifying that ratification by a managerialemployee is what counts in justifying corporate
punishment. 5 4 If we see misbehavior as implicitly self-ratifying (as
we should), then it only makes sense to say that when employees
whose ratification of misbehavior counts toward corporate punishment themselves misbehave, corporate punishment is similarly
proper. That is, Restatement section 909(c) (allowing corporate punishment for a managerial employee's misbehavior)is the natural complement of Restatement section 909(d) (allowing corporate punishment
for a managerial employee's ratification of other's misbehavior).
Lake Shore itself is clear that it does not abolish corporate punitive
damages altogether: "No doubt, a corporation, like a natural person,
may be held liable in exemplary or punitive damages for the act of an
agent within the scope of his employment, provided the criminal intent, necessary to warrant the imposition of such damages, is brought
home to the corporation."55 The Court did not, however, explain what
"brought home" means. The Court clearly rejected the theory that
showing just any employee's misbehavior is enough, but the Court did
not say how high is high enough.5 6
53. The regress might stop if the board of directors ratified an instance of misbehavior, and we were to treat the board differently from others who act on behalf of
the corporation. But the argument might still be raised that the board's decision
was ultra vires, or otherwise contrary to corporate policy or not really the corporation's action, if not ratified. In any event, I assume that those who adopt Restrictive Rules want to allow corporate punishment even when misbehavior is not
specifically adopted by the board of directors. However, stating a requirement of
ratification does not say when that is possible; thus the 5R Problem.
54. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 909 (1979).
55. 147 U.S. at 111.
56. The cases that Lake Shore cites at this point do not, for the most part, answer the
food-chain question with much clarity. Phila., Wilmington. & Balt. R.R. Co. v.
Quigley, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 202, 209-10 (1858), held that a corporation could be
liable for libel, which requires malice, but reversed punitive damages without
making any food-chain rule clear. In fact, the Court seems to adopt a scope-ofemployment Liberal Rule in rejecting the defendant's claims that it necessarily
lacked malice. Id. at 214. Milwaukee & St. Paul R.R. Co. v. Arms, 91 U.S. 489,
495 (1875), reversed punitive damages because of the lack of willfulness. The
Court does not suggest any food-chain limit. Denver & Rio Grande Ry. Co. v.
Harris, 122 U.S. 597, 610 (1887), affirms punitive damages and notes that the
"controlling officers" and "governing officers" were the ones who misbehaved.
However, it is not clear whether misconduct by officials of such rank is required
for punitive damages. Caldwell v. N. J. Steamboat Co., 2 Sickels 282, 1872 WL
9721 (N.Y. 1872), notes only a requirement of notice of an employee's bad habits,
without explaining who in the corporate hierarchy must have such notice. However, the treatise cited in Caldwell makes a little headway in answering the food-
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An old maritime case from Justice Story, 1818's The Amiable
Nancy, similarly excluded punitive damages for those who are "innocent of the demerit of this transaction, having neither directed it, nor
countenanced it, nor participated in it in the slightest degree." 57 Such
a requirement, if applied to corporations, similarly poses a 5R Problem (if it does not eliminate corporate punitive damages altogether).
All of the instances of 5R Problems I have uncovered apply only to
corporate punitive damages; none deal with corporate crime. Statutes
from three states (Ohio, Kentucky, and Kansas)5 8 and current cases
from another ten jurisdictions (federal law, Colorado, Connecticut,
Delaware, Hawaii, North Dakota, Rhode Island, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin) 59 impose ratification requirements for corporate
punitive damages that pose 5R Problems. As noted above, four of
these states (Colorado, Delaware, Kansas, and West Virginia) also follow the Restatement, making clear that corporate punitive damages
are authorized, but as with Lake Shore, it is not clear exactly when.

chain question, suggesting that the misbehavior of "superintending agents" may
warrant corporate punishment. THOMAS G. SHEARMAN & AMASA A. REDFIELD, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE § 601, at 676-77 (2d ed. 1870).
57. The Amiable Nancy, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 546, 558-59 (1818). Some current admiralty cases follow the Restatements. See, e.g., Protectus Alpha Navigation Co. v.
N. Pac. Grain Growers, Inc., 767 F.2d 1379, 1386 (9th Cir. 1985). Others follow
Lake Shore. See, e.g., In re P & E Boat Rentals, Inc., 872 F.2d 642, 652 (5th Cir.
1989); U.S. Steel Corp. v. Fuhrman, 407 F.2d 1143, 1148 (6th Cir. 1969);
Muratore v. MIS Scotia Prince, 845 F.2d 347, 355-56 (1st Cir. 1988). Others fall
somewhere in-between (on the assumption that Lake Shore is narrower than the
Restatement). See, e.g., CEH, Inc. v. F/V Seafarer, 70 F.3d 694, 705 (1st Cir.
1995).
In Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, argued in February 2008, the Supreme Court
considered whether to overrule the Ninth Circuit's adoption of the Restatement
in ProspectusAlpha. 128 S. Ct. 1183 (2008). Exxon relied on The Amiable Nancy
to propose a rule posing a 5R Problem. See Brief of Petitioner at 18, Exxon Shipping Co, No. 07-219 (U.S. Dec. 17, 2007), 2007 WL 4439454 (contending for "maritime-law rule barring vicarious punitive damages."). At the oral argument, Chief
Justice Roberts' questions suggested a familiarity with the basic 5R issue. See
Transcript of Oral Argument at 6, Exxon Shipping Co., No. 07-219 (U.S. Feb. 27,
2008), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral-arguments/argumenttranscripts/07-219.pdf ("[Ilt's not quite correct to say only the owner. In other
words, it is a certain level of employee, because corporations only act through
individuals. It is a certain level of employee in the company."). With Justice Alito
recused, the Court split 4-4 on the issue, leaving the circuit split intact. Exxon
Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2616 (2008).
58. See infra notes 175 (Ohio), 155 (Kentucky), and 210 (Kansas).
59. See infra notes 132 (Colorado), 200 (Connecticut), 136 (Delaware), 142 (Hawaii),
170 (North Dakota), 225 (Rhode Island), 231 (Virginia), 187 (West Virginia), and
235 (Wisconsin). A prominent older case from Florida also poses a 5R Problem.
See infra note 205.
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4. Corporate-PolicyRules
As noted above, several Restrictive Rules in both corporate crime
and corporate punitive damages place emphasis on whether a decision
is made by a policymaker. But it might be possible for policy, or corporate culture, to exist, even without an explicit decision by a policymaker.6 0 For instance, a corporation might have twenty employees
governed by a single supervisor who only intervenes occasionally. The
employees may, by learning from each other, develop certain informal
practices and customs without the dictation of the supervisor. If it is
the existence of policy as such that should matter for corporate punishment, then a Restrictive Rule that requires misbehavior or ratification by a policymaker will be too restrictive. Spontaneous order may
arise among low-level employees of a corporation, even without any
policymaker directing particular actions: "[Flirms . . .are a response
to a lack of centralized knowledge on the part of the individuals who
make up the firm. The firm coordinates diffuse knowledge both
through planned, hierarchical structures and rules and through spontaneously generated, interstitial rules and customs, best captured in
6
the phrase 'corporate culture."' 1
A few states have articulated rules allowing corporations to avoid
punishment when misbehavior is contrary to the way corporations'
employees usually behave. The District of Columbia allows punitive
damages if a corporate defendant engaged in a "general practice" of
62
Mismisbehavior, even if the misbehaving employee is a minor one.
sissippi has reversed a punitive award where a misbehaving employee's actions were contrary to a corporate policy manual, 63 and
indicated that punitive damages depend on an assessment of the gen60. The existence of informal customs in addition to officially promulgated policies is
recognized in the text of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and is very important for municipal
liability. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978).
61. John M. Czarnetzky, Time, Uncertainty, and the Law of CorporateReorganizations, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 2939, 2945 (1999) (describing the views of Austrian
economists such as Friedrich W. Hayek). The Sentencing Guidelines' reference to
the "pervasive" activity among supervisory "substantial authority" employeeswhich substitutes for actions by policymaking "high level" employees, see infra
note 82 and accompanying text-suggests a similar idea of policy that emerges
through spontaneous Hayekian processes, rather than only through the explicit
actions of policymakers.
62. See Remeikis v. Boss & Phelps, Inc., 419 A.2d 986, 992 (D.C. 1980). Construing
West Virginia law, the District Court for the District of Columbia held that a
"pattern of conduct" would support corporate punitive damages. Karaahmetoglu
v. Res-Care, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 2d 183, 189 (D.D.C. 2007). The court combined
this rule with one posing a 5R Problem. Id. ("[1n the absence of a showing by the
plaintiff that [the corporate defendant] acted with malice or that [the victim's]
abuse was part of a pattern of such abuse, the Court will grant summary judgment for the defendants on the punitive damages claim.").
63. Gamble ex rel. Gamble v. Dollar Gen. Corp., 852 So. 2d 5, 15 (Miss. 2003).
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eral character of a corporation.64 West Virginia excludes corporate
criminal liability for "a single offense committed by . .. an agent or
65
servant in violation of the rules of such company."
Such an approach is closely akin to a due-diligence defense, which
would allow any employee's misbehavior to count, but would remove
liability if corporate policymakers acted diligently to prevent it.66 The
MPC rule for minor crimes allows liability, like the Liberal Rule, for
the behavior even of minor employees. 6 7 However, unlike the Liberal
Rule, it allows corporations to defend against liability if "the high
managerial agent having supervisory authority over the subject mat68
ter of the offense employed due diligence to prevent its commission."
69
New Jersey takes this approach for all corporate crimes.
A rule that required the corporate defendant to show its due diligence would differ procedurally from a rule that required the government or civil plaintiff to show that the misbehaving employee acted in
line with corporate policy or culture, but the substantive rule of conduct-no liability where an employee's misbehavior is contrary to cor64. Doe ex rel. Doe v. Salvation Army, 835 So. 2d 76, 81-82 (Miss. 2003) (reversing
punitive damages because an employee's actions were inconsistent with the corporate defendant's "goals and doctrines" and what the corporate defendant
"promotes").
65. State v. Bait. & Ohio R.R. Co., 64 S.E. 735, 735-36 (W. Va. 1909).
66. Richard Gruner suggests, contrary to all other observers, that there actually is a
due-diligence defense to corporate criminal liability under current federal law.
See RICHARD S. GRUNER, CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY AND PREVENTION § 6.01,
at 6-3 to 6-4 (2004). However, he relies on United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp.,
467 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1972), which explicitly rejects such a defense: "[A]s a
general rule a corporation is liable under the Sherman Act for the acts of its
agents in the scope of their employment, even though contrary to general corporate policy and express instructions to the agent." Hilton Hotels, 467 F.2d at
1007. Perhaps Gruner means to pick up on "as a general rule" to infer the possible existence of a contrary-to-policy defense in other circumstances. However, in
the context, that reading seems implausible. This statement from Hilton Hotels
is quoted in United States v. Cadillac Overall Supply Co., 568 F.2d 1078, 1090
(5th Cir. 1978). Gruner says that with this quotation, the Fifth Circuit "has endorsed the due diligence defense and corporate criminal liability standards described in Hilton." RICHARD S. GRUNER, CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY AND
PREVENTION § 6.01, at 6-4 (2004). On the contrary; the Fifth Circuit in Cadillac
Overall endorsed Hilton's rejection of a due diligence defense to corporate criminal liability. Gruner also cites United States v. Armour & Co., 168 F.2d 342 (3d
Cir. 1948), which states plainly, "No distinctions are made in these cases [considering corporate criminal liability] between officers and agents, or between persons holding positions involving varying degrees of responsibility." RICHARD S.
GRUNER, CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY AND PREVENTION § 6.01, at 6-4 to 6-5

(2004). The court in Armour noted that management should have been aware of
the misbehavior, but did not suggest that it would have arrived at a different
result had that not been the case. See 168 F.2d at 343.
67.

See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(5) (1962).

68. Id.
69. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-7(c) (West 2005).
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porate policy and culture-would be the same. There would also be an
important difference about what to do where there is no policy on an
issue. 70 If the plaintiff or government were required to show conformity of an employee's misbehavior with corporate policy, then such
cases would allow no punishment. If, however, the corporate defendant were required to show a contrary corporate policy, then such
cases would allow corporate punishment.
It is possible to add a contrary-to-corporate-policy defense to a Restrictive Rule that already limits corporate punishment to misbehavior by relatively-important employees. Applying "the general common
law of agency," the Supreme Court fashioned such a Restrictive Rule
for Title VII corporate punitive damages in Kolstad v. American Dental Association.71 The Court began with the Restatement's Restrictive
Rule, allowing punishment for any actions of managerial employees
within the scope of their employment, but argued that this was still
too permissive. As a result, the Court also barred punitive damages if
a managerial employee's actions were contrary to a corporate goodfaith policy to comply with Title VII. The Court explained: "Where an
employer has undertaken such good faith efforts at Title VII compliance, it demonstrates that it never acted in reckless disregard of federally protected rights."7 2
A number of commentators have suggested corporate-policy Restrictive Rules.7 3 But only the four jurisdictions described above (Mis70. We might call this an ontological gap in policy-the existence of actions of corporate employees not governed by corporate policy either way. Different burdens of
proof address the corresponding epistemic gap-where the fact-finder does not
know whether or not actions of corporate employees are consistent with corporate
policy.
71. 527 U.S. 526, 542 (1999).
72. Id. at 544-46. The Court's rationale for adding a good-faith defense for punitive
damages is not based on anything special about Title VII. Whatever sort of misbehavior is at issue, if that misbehavior is contrary to corporate good-faith efforts
to comply with the law, there is an equally strong argument against punishing a
corporation. We could equally say for any sort of legal obligations that "[w] here
an employer has undertaken such good faith efforts at [avoiding misbehavior by
employees], it demonstrates that it never acted in reckless disregard of [its legal
obligations]." The reward of a punitive-damages defense would be an equally appropriate incentive for any sort of program of following the law.
73. Pamela Bucy has prominently advocated a Restrictive Rule for corporate crime
that depends on whether an employee's misbehavior is the sort characteristic of a
corporation's culture or ethos. Pamela H. Bucy, CorporateEthos: A Standardfor
Imposing Corporate Criminal Liability, 75 MINN. L. REv. 1095 (1991). The editors of the Harvard Law Review advocated a similar rule, phrased as a due-diligence defense. Developments in the Law: Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate
Behavior Through Criminal Sanctions, 92 HARv. L. REV. 1227, 1257-58 (1979).
See also Ellen S. Podgor, A New Corporate World Mandates A "Good Faith"Affirmative Defense, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1537 (2007); Andrew Weissman, A New
Approach to Corporate CriminalLiability, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1319, 1322 (2007)
(suggesting "[r]ethinking the standard for criminal corporate liability to require
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sissippi and the District of Columbia's rules on corporate punitive
damages, and New Jersey and West Virginia's rules on corporate
crime) adopt such rules. Similar to Kolstad's hybrid of the Restatement with a good-faith defense, Ohio's rule for corporate crime also
combines a due-diligence defense with a rule limiting corporate liabil4
ity to misbehavior by policymakers.7
5. A Survey of Restrictive-Rule Touchstones
Collecting the results for our sixty-one Restrictive Rules (counting
federal law as two, for Title VII and the general common law), we find
an interesting array of ultimate touchstones for who must misbehave
to support corporate punishment.
Particularly striking in this table of Restrictive Rules is the difference between the thirty-six rules for corporate crime and the thirtyfive rules for corporate punitive damages. The punitive-damages versions of the rules tend to have much less clarity than the rules for
corporate crime. The commentary to the MPC is right in noting that
while its own rules "are necessarily very general[,] ...they are considerably more precise than those enunciated by many courts as a matter
of decisional law,"75 and in the area of corporate crime, the MPC has
had an important influence in favor of more precision. If I am right in
my argument below that corporate crime and corporate punitive damages should follow the same food-chain rule, courts applying Restrictive Rules that lack precise definition would do well to pay attention to
the variety of standards used in clarifying other Restrictive Rules.
Also, only two of the sixteen jurisdictions with Restrictive Rules in
both fields have similar rules for each field; Guam and Minnesota, follow policymaker touchstones in both fields. But Colorado, Delaware,
the government to show that the company did not have a bona fide compliance
program to detect and deter the criminal conduct"). The AuSTRALIAN CRIMINAL
CODE allows corporate criminal liability based on a "corporate culture.., within
the body corporate that directed, encouraged, tolerated or led to non-compliance
with the relevant provision," or the lack of a "corporate culture that required compliance." § 12.3(2)(c)-(d), availableat http://www.comlaw.gov.au/comlaw/management.nsf/lookupindexpagesbyid/IP200401867. It defines "corporate culture" as
an "attitude, policy, rule, course of conduct or practice existing within the body
corporate generally or in the part of the body corporate generally or in the part of
the body corporate in which the relevant activities takes [sic] place." Id.
§ 12.3(6). Section 12.3(2)(b) and (3) of the Code also provide for liability based on
an MPC-style policymaker high-managerial-agent rule with a due-diligence defense (i.e., Ohio's Kolstad-like rule), See, e.g., Mees v. Roads Corp., (2003) 128
F.C.R. 418, 2003 WL 1821857 (Fed. Ct. Austl.). In my work in progress, I agree
with such an approach based on corporate policy and corporate culture, arguing
that it would fit well with an approach to criminal responsibility that makes individual character central to an understanding of mens rea and criminal excuses.
74. See infra notes 173-74.
75. MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTrARIES § 2.07 cmt. 2, at 339 (1985).
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New York

Superior Officers
Officers

Louisiana
Arizona

Policymakers

Guam
Kentucky
Michigan
Colorado
Georgia
Idaho
Illinois
Iowa

Supervisors

Pollcymakers or
Supervisors

Policy

Minnesota

California

Minnesota

Pennsylvania
Texas

Guam
Illinois

Nevada
New Jersey

Montan
New York
North Dakota
Oregon
Washington

New Jersey

District of Columbia

Corporate

West Virginia

Mississippi

Corporate
Policy/Managerial
Employee Hybrid

Ohio

Federal (Title VII)
Federal (common law)
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Hawaii
Kansas

Ratification
Requirement
(R Problem)
...........
...
...
No clear definition
of "highmanagerial
agent" or
"anageial agent"
or "manager"

Arkansas
Delaware
Hawaii
Utah

Kantsas

K entucky
Alaska
Florida
Idaho
Iowa
New Mexico
North Carolina

North Dakota
Ohio
Rhode Island
Virginia
West Virginia
Wisconsin
South Dakota
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virgin Islands
Wyoming

Table 1: Survey of Restrictive Rule touchstones.
Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, New Jersey, New York, North
Dakota, Ohio, Texas, and West Virginia all follow different rules, or
have different degrees of precision, in the two fields.
6. Amount-of-Punishment Rules

The discussions above survey the variety of answers to the threshold question of when an employee's misbehavior warrants corporate
punishment. But there are also very similar food-chain issues related
to how much punishment a corporation deserves.
Federal criminal law's Liberal Rule recognizes no food-chain defense to criminal liability, but chapter 8 of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines recognize the food-chain issue as an important factor in
deciding the amount of punishment. The Guidelines lower a corporation's sentence if only lower-level employees were involved in a crime
or if the crime occurred despite an "effective compliance and ethics
program." To implement these rules, the Guidelines divide employees

into three categories: "high-level," "substantial authority," and others.
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the second
The first key term is described in terms of policy-making,76
77
in terms of discretion and the supervision of others.
The Introductory Commentary for chapter 8 as a whole lists "the
existence of an effective compliance and ethics program" as a mitigating factor. 78 Section 8B2.1 gives great detail on what constitutes an
"effective compliance and ethics program." In brief, through such a
program an organization would "(1) exercise due diligence to prevent
and detect criminal conduct; and (2) otherwise promote an organizational culture that encourages ethical conduct and a commitment to
compliance with the law." 7 9 Section 8C2.5(f)(1) allows a three-point
reduction in "culpability points"8 0 if an employee's crime occurred in
8
spite of such a program. 1
The "high level" and "substantial authority" concepts are relevant
both for aggravation of culpability (if such employees are involved in a
crime) and for its mitigation (if there is an effective compliance program). Section 8C2.5(b) sets out the rules on food-chain aggravation
of culpability. They apply if a member of high-level personnel is culpable regarding a crime (i.e., either "participated in, condoned, or was
tolerance of
willfully ignorant of the offense"), or if there is "pervasive"
82
a crime among substantial-authority personnel.
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8A1.2 cmt. n.3(b) (2007).
Id. § 8A1.2 cmt. n.3(c).
Id. ch. 8, introductory cmt.
Id. § 8B2.1(a).
Id. § 8C2.5. These points are different from the "offense level" points used to
determine sentences throughout the Guidelines. Under the table in section
8C2.6, culpability points affect the range of permitted sentences by allowing a
fine to be multiplied by up to 4, or reduced by a factor of up to 20.
81. The reduction does not apply, though, if there is unreasonable delay in reporting
the offense to governmental authorities, U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
§ 8C2.5(f)(2) (2007), or if high-level personnel of either an organization or of an
over-200-employee unit (or the employee responsible for maintaining the compliance program itselfl), was culpable regarding the crime. See id. § 8C2.5(f)(3)(A)
(referring to "an individual described in § 8B2.1(b)(2)(B) or (C)); id.
§ 8B2.1(b)(2)(B) ("Specific individual(s) within high-level personnel shall be assigned overall responsibility for the compliance and ethics program."); id.
§ 8B2.1(b)(2)(C) ("Specific individual(s) within the organization shall be delegated day-to-day operational responsibility for the compliance and ethics
program.").
For under-200-employee organizations, culpability of high-level personnel
only raises a rebuttable presumption that a compliance program is ineffective,
and a similar rebuttable presumption arises if substantial-authority personnel
are involved for an organization of any size. Id. § 8C2.5(f)(3)(B).
82. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5(b). The rules apply if either an
entire organization or a unit within an organization has a particular number of
employees. For organizations or units over 5000 employees, such aggravating
circumstances increase the culpability score by 5 culpability points. Id.
§ 8C2.5(b)(1). For organizations or units between 1000 and 5000 employees, such
aggravating circumstances increase the culpability score by 4 points. Id.
§ 8C2.5(b)(2). For organizations or units between 200 and 1000 employees, such
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
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In general, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines represent a far more
detailed assessment of the quantum of punishment appropriate to different sorts of misbehavior than anything in the law of punitive damages. The constitutional standards of BMW v. Gore and its progeny,
for instance, merely state the importance of reprehensibility, amount
of actual harm, and comparison to other penalties,8 3 while state statutes on the size of punitive damages generally only list several factors
to be considered by the jury.8 4 Oklahoma and Minnesota's statutes
list the food-chain issue among these size-of-punitive-damages factors,
but most such statutes do not.8 5 Guidelines to govern the size of punitive damages, akin to sentencing guidelines, may make more sense
than the current laundry lists of factors. 8 6 Especially for Liberal Rule
states, it would make eminent sense to include food-chain issues in
such guidelines, as in the Sentencing Guidelines. Even Restrictive
Rule states might, however, distinguish among relative Big-Cheeses
in its hierarchy; a misbehaving employee might be important enough
to warrant some punishment, but sufficiently low-level that such punishment should be relatively small.
aggravating circumstances increase the culpability score by 3 points. Id.
§ 8C2.5(b)(3). For organizations smaller than 200 employees, the guidelines both
omit the "unit" prong, and find aggravating circumstances if a substantial-authority employee is culpable regarding the crime. See id § 8C2.5(b)(4)-(5). For
organizations between 50 and 200 employees, such aggravation adds 2 points.
Id. § 8C2.5(b)(4). For organizations between 10 and 50 employees, such aggravation adds 1 point. Id. § 8C2.5(b)(5).
83. See Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057, 1062-63 (2007); State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 418 (2003); Cooper Indus., Inc. v.
Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 440 (2001); BMW of N. Am., Inc., v.
Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574-75 (1996).
84. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.020(c) (2004); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3702(b) (2005);
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.186(2) (West 2006); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 549.20(3)
(West 2000); Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-1-65(e) (West 1999); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1221(7)(b) (2005); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 9.1(A) (West 2008); Crookston v. Fire
Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 808 (Utah 1991); MODEL PUNITIVE DAMAGES ACT § 7(a)

(1996), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll~archives/ulc/mpda/MPDAFNA
L.pdf.
85. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 549.20(3) (West 2000) (listing as a factor for the size of
punitive damages "the number and level of employees involved in causing or concealing the misconduct"); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 9. l(A)(6) (West 2008) (listing
as a factor for the size of punitive damages "[i]n the case of a defendant which is a
corporation or other entity, the number and level of employees involved in causing or concealing the misconduct").
86. See generally Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2629 (2008) ("[Als
long 'as there are no punitive-damages guidelines, correspoinding to the federal
and state sentencing guidelines, it is inevitable that the specific amount of punitive damages awarded whether by a judge or by a jury will be arbitrary.'" (quoting Mathias v. Accor Econ. Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672, 678 (7th Cir. 2003)));
Jenny Mao Jiang, Whimsical Punishment: The Vice of Federal Intervention, Constitutionalization,and Substantive Due Process in Punitive Damages Law, 94
CAL. L. REV. 793, 795 (2006).
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In future work I will defend an approach to food-chain issues that
recognizes that the rogue-employee phenomenon need not be an all-ornothing issue, but can come in degrees. If that is right, then foodchain issues should inform both the amount of punishment as well as
its availability. Here I merely highlight the issue because it is usually
overlooked; an amount-of-punishment approach is a way to adopt a
Liberal Rule while recognizing in part the factors that motivate courts
to adopt the Restrictive Rule.
7.

Prosecutorial-DiscretionRules

In addition to these food-chain issues in federal criminal sentencing, the federal Liberal Rule for corporate crime is tempered by rules
governing prosecutors. Near-identical memoranda by Deputy Attorneys General Eric Holder in 1999,87 Larry Thompson in 2003,88 and
Paul McNulty in 200689 recognize food-chain issues as relevant to the
federal charging decision. The memoranda list several factors that
guide whether to indict a corporation, five of which include:

"

"The pervasiveness of wrongdoing within the corporation, including the
complicity in, or condonation of, the wrongdoing by corporate
management."9 0
" "The corporation's history of similar conduct, including prior criminal,
civil, and regulatory enforcement actions against it." 9 1
" "The corporation's timely and voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing and its
willingness to cooperate in the investigation of its agents, including, if necessary, the9 2waiver of the corporate attorney-client and work product
privileges."
93
" "The existence and adequacy of the corporation's compliance program."

87.
88.

ERIC HOLDER, DEP'T OF JUSTICE MEMORANDUM: FEDERAL PROSECUTION OF CORPORATIONS (June 16, 1999) [hereinafter HOLDER MEMORANDUM], available at http:l!
www.usdoj.gov/criminaYfraud/docs/reports/1999/chargingcorps.html.
LARRY THOMPSON, DEP'T OF JUSTICE MEMORANDUM: FEDERAL PROSECUTION OF
BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS (Jan. 20, 2003) [hereinafter THOMPSON MEMORANDUM],

available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/corporateguidelines.htm.
89.

PAUL McNULTY, DEP'T OF JUSTICE MEMORANDUM: PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL PROSECUTION OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS (Dec. 12, 2006) [hereinafter McNuLTY MEMORANDUM], available at http:/www.usdoj.gov/dag/speeches/2006/mcnulty-memo.

pdf.
90. HOLDER MEMORANDUM, supra note 87, part II(A)(2); see also McNULT MEMORANDUM, supra note 89, part III(A)(2), at 4 (repeating same language); THOMPSON
MEMORANDUM, supra note 88, part II(A)(2) (repeating same language).
91. HOLDER MEMORANDUM, supra note 87, part II(A)(3); see also McNULTY MEMORANDUM, supra note 89, part III(A)(3), at 4 (repeating same language); THOMPSON
MEMORANDUM, supra note 88, part II(A)(3) (repeating same language).
92. HOLDER MEMORANDUM, supra note 87, part II(A)(4); see also McNULTY MEMORANDUM, supra note 89, part III(A)(4), at 4 (repeating same language, but omitting
"including, if necessary, the waiver of the corporate attorney-client and work
product privileges"); THOMPSON MEMORANDUM, supra note 88, part I(A)(4) (repeating same language).
93. HOLDER MEMORANDUM, supra note 87, part II(A)(5); see also McNuLTY MEMORANDUM, supra note 89, part III(A)(5), at 4 (repeating same language, but adding
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any efforts to implement an
improve an existing one, to
or terminate wrongdoers, to
the relevant government

The memoranda comment on when a prosecutor should acknowledge a
rogue employee as a reason not to prosecute:
Charging a corporation for even minor misconduct may be appropriate where
the wrongdoing was pervasive and was undertaken by a large number of employees or by all the employees in a particular role within the corporation, e.g.,
salesmen or procurement officers, or was condoned by upper management.
On the other hand, in certain limited circumstances, it may not be appropriate
to impose liability upon a corporation, particularly one with a compliance program in place, under a strict respondeat superiortheory for the single isolated
Of these factors, the most important is the role of
act of a rogue employee ....
management. Although acts of even low-level employees may result in criminal liability, a corporation is directed by its management and management is
in which criminal conduct is either discourresponsible for a corporate culture
95
aged or tacitly encouraged.

Past conduct is relevant because it suggests a deficient corporate culture. 96 Corporate willingness to help in the prosecution of employees,
97
while not conclusive, is a relevant factor for corporate culpability.
The memoranda are quick to point out that corporate compliance programs are not a defense, 98 but note some factors in assessing them as
a reason not to prosecute.9 9

94.
95.

96.

97.
98.

99.

(and stressing) that compliance programs should be "pre-existing"); THOMPSON
MEMORANDUM, supra note 88, part II(A)(5) (repeating same language).
HOLDER MEMORANDUM, supra note 87, part II(A)(6); see also McNULTY MEMORANDUM, supra note 89, part III(A)(6), at 4 (repeating same language); THOMPSON
MEMORANDUM, supra note 88, part II(A)(6) (repeating same language).
HOLDER MEMORANDUM, supra note 87, part IV(A)-(B). The memorandum then
quotes the statement on "pervasiveness" in U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5 cmt. n.4 (2006). HOLDER MEMORANDUM, supra note 87, part IV(B);
see also McNULTY MEMORANDUM, supra note 89, part V(A)-(B), at 6 (repeating
same language and quotation from Sentencing Guidelines); THOMPSON MEMORANDUM, supra note 88, part IV(A)-(B) (repeating same language and quotation from
Sentencing Guidelines).
HOLDER MEMORANDUM, supra note 87, part V(B) (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5(c)(2006)); see also McNULTY MEMORANDUM, supra note 89,
part VI(B), at 6-7 (repeating same language); THOMPSON MEMORANDUM, supra
note 88, part V(B) (repeating same language).
HOLDER MEMORANDUM, supra note 87, part VI(B); see also McNuLTY MEMORANDUM, supra note 89, part VII (B)(5), at 12 (repeating same language); THOMPSON
MEMORANDUM, supra note 88, part VI(B) (repeating same language).
See HOLDER MEMORANDUM, supra note 87, part VII(B) ("A corporate compliance
program, even one specifically prohibiting the very conduct in question, does not
absolve the corporation from criminal liability under the doctrine of respondeat
superior."); McNuLTY MEMORANDUM, supra note 89, part VIII (B), at 13 (repeating same language); THOMPSON MEMORANDUM, supra note 88, part VII(B) (repeating same language).
HOLDER MEMORANDUM, supra note 87, part VII(B). The Holder Memorandum
cites the U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8A1.2 cmt. n.3(k) (2006) for "a
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In general, then, these guidelines highlight the same factors as the
Restrictive Rules explained above. Corporate culture and implicit policy as well as the behavior of supervisors and policymakers are all
important, but the guidelines do not specify exactly how important.
These memoranda are, of course, not enforceable parts of federal law,
and even if they were, they do not set any clear rules. They do, however, suggest that those in charge of administering the federal criminal law think that there should be a food-chain limit on corporate
punishment, even though federal criminal law as such, following a
Liberal Rule, does not recognize one.1 00
III.

THE SCHIZOPHRENIC LANDSCAPE OF THE LAW

I will now classify American jurisdictions regarding their adherence to either a Liberal Rule or Restrictive Rule with respect to corporate crimes and corporate punitive damages. Four possibilities exist.
States can be Consistently Liberal or Consistently Restrictive in both
areas of the law. They can also adopt the Liberal Rule for corporate
crimes but the Restrictive Rule for corporate punitive damages (what
I call Federal Schizophrenia) or do the reverse, adopting a Liberal
Rule for punitive damages but a Restrictive Rule for corporate crimes
(what I call Pennsylvania Schizophrenia).
detailed review of these and other factors concerning corporate compliance programs." See HOLDER MEMORANDUM, supra note 87, at n.5; see also McNULTY
MEMORANDUM, supra note 89, part VIII(B), at 14 & n.6 (repeating same language); THOMPSON MEMORANDUM, supra note 88, part VII(B) & n.6 (repeating
same language).
100. In addition to these general DOJ memoranda, federal prosecutorial guidelines in
specific subject areas recognize food-chain limits on proper corporate punishment. A Securities and Exchange Commission report of October 23, 2001 notes
that several food-chain factors are relevant to whether the SEC will take action
against a corporation. Commission Statement on the Relationship of Cooperation
to Agency Enforcement Decisions, Exchange Act Release No. 44,969, [2001-2003
Transfer Binder Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 74,985, at 63,195 (Oct. 23, 2001), available at 2001 WL 1301408.
The Commission is very clear that the factors it identifies are not binding. See id.
at 63,196, 2001 WL 1301408 at *2. However, the report asks many of the same
questions that appear in other discussions of food-chain issues. Id. at 63,197-98,
2001 WL 1301408 at *2-*3. Another SEC report of January 4, 2006, notes similar food-chain factors related to the behavior of "management" as relevant to its
decision to impose corporate penalties. Statement of the Securities and Exchange Commission Concerning Financial Penalties (Jan. 4, 2006), http://www.
sec.gov/news/press/2006-4.htm. The Federal Financial Institutions Examination
Council's policy on civil penalties, adopted on June 3, 1998, recognizes the relevance of whether misbehavior is committed merely by rogue low-level employees
or is similar to other corporate misbehavior. Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, Assessment of Civil Money Penalties, 63 Fed. Reg. 30226-02
(June 3, 1998), available at 1998 WL 280287.
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Of the fifty-five American jurisdictions I survey, just over half,
twenty-eight, take inconsistent positions on corporate crime and corporate punitive damages. All four possible approaches are well-represented among American jurisdictions.
" Eleven jurisdictions (Alabama, Indiana, Maryland, Maine, Massachusetts,
Nebraska, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, Puerto Rico, South Carolina, and
Tennessee) are Consistently Liberal; they allow corporate punishment for
any employees' misbehavior, either under criminal law or through punitive damages.
* Sixteen jurisdictions (Colorado, Delaware, Guam, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois,
Iowa, Kentucky, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Ohio,
Texas, Utah, and West Virginia) are Consistently Restrictive; they impose
a food-chain restriction on either sort of corporate punishment.
* Eighteen jurisdictions (federal law, Alaska, California, Connecticut, the
District of Columbia, Florida, Kansas, Mississippi, Nevada, New Mexico,
North Carolina, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Vermont, Virginia, the Virgin Islands, Wisconsin, and Wyoming) suffer from Federal Schizophrenia,
imposing food-chain restrictions only on corporate punishment through
punitive damages, but allowing corporate criminal liability more liberally.
* Ten states (Arizona, Arkansas, Georgia, Louisiana, Michigan, Missouri,
Montana, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Washington) suffer from Pennsylvania Schizophrenia, imposing food-chain restrictions only on corporate
criminal liability, while allowing punitive damages more liberally.

Table 2 sets out these lists of states in a table, while table 3 gives more
detail about the types of rules within these broad divisions. Figures 1,
2, and 3 illustrate a seeming lack of any significant geographical pattern among the groups of states. Tables 4 through 8 give more details
about each type of jurisdiction, especially the relevant touchstone, if
specified, for Restrictive Rules.
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Consistently Liberal

Pennsylvania Schizophrenia

Aldaaa

New Hampshire*

Arizona

Missouri

I
Maine

Oklahoma'
Puerto Rico"

Massand
t .South
Carolina*
Nebraskae
Tennessee

Arkansas
Georgia
Louisiana'
Michigan*

Montana
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Washington

Federal Schizophrenia

Consistently Restrictive

Federal law
Alaska
California
Connecticut*
District of
Columbia
Florida
Kansas
Mississipp
Nevada

New Mexico*
North Carolina
Rhode Island
Rh Dsla
Sot
Vermnt
Virginia
Virgin Islands
Wisconsin
W

Colorado
Delaware
Guam
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Iowa
Kentucky

Minnesota
New Jersey
New York
North Dakota
Ohio
Texas
Utah
West Virginia

Application of Liberal-Rule presumption for criminal law.
Punitive damages available only under statutes.
Application of Liberal-Rule presumption for punitive damages.
Idiosyncratically-characterized punitive damages.

Table 2: Distribution ofjurisdictions on food-chain issue in corporate
crime and corporate punitive damages.
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102. Mobile & 0. It. Co. v. Seals, 13 So. 917 (Ala. 1893). See supro soibsctio I/A,2;
see also Pat. Milt. l~ie Ins. Co'.v. Iaslip, ,199 1',
.'
, 15 (1991) (iejeiting a
constitutional cballenge to Alalmima's Lhcral
ule fir cpa'ato puniitive
dlamage s).
101.

Statutes
i
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Jurisdiction

Liberal Rule for
Criminal Law

Liberal Rule for
Punitive Damages

Indiana

Statute 1 0 3

Hibschman Pontiac
(1977)104

Maine

Statute

105

Goddard (1869)106
107

Maryland

Liberal Rule presumed

Massachusetts

Beneficial Finance (1971)109

Embrey (1982)108
Kansallis Finance
(1996);110
Punitive damages only
under statute

103. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-2-3(a) (LexisNexis 2004); see also Prime Mortgage USA,

Inc. v. Nichols, 885 N.E.2d 628, 653-55 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (discussing the
statute).
104. Bud Wolf Chevrolet, Inc. v. Robertson, 519 N.E.2d 135, 137 (Ind. 1988);
Hibschman Pontiac, Inc. v. Batchelor, 362 N.E.2d 845, 848 (Ind. 1977).
105. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 60(1) (2006); see also State v. Cornhuskers Motor

Lines, Inc., 854 A.2d 189, 191 n.3 (Me. 2004) (applying statute).
106. Goddard v. Grand Trunk Ry., 57 Me. 202, 1869 WL 2230 (1869). See supra
subsection II.A.2; see also Muratore v. M/S Scotia Prince, 663 F. Supp. 484, 489
n.6 (D. Me. 1987) ("Although an 1869 case, Goddard continues to be good law.");
Muratore, 663 F. Supp. at 488-89 (rejecting suggestion to apply the Restatement
"managerial capacity" rule).
107. Statutes and cases allow corporate criminal liability without suggesting a foodchain limit. See MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW, § 1-101(h) (LexisNexis 2002);
Randall Book Corp. v. State, 558 A.2d 715 (Md. 1989).
108. Embrey v. Holly, 442 A.2d 966, 970-71 (Md. 1982).
109. Commonwealth v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 275 N.E.2d 33, 72-73 (Mass. 1971) (giving
extensive rejection of MPC's Restrictive Rule); see also Commonwealth v. Angelo
Todesca Corp., 842 N.E.2d 930, 938 (Mass. 2006) (same reasoning);
Commonwealth v. L.A.L. Corp., 511 N.E.2d 599, 601-03 (Mass. 1987) (same
reasoning); Commonwealth v. Duddie Ford, Inc., 551 N.E.2d 1211, 1220-21
(Mass. App. Ct. 1990) (same reasoning), rev'd on other grounds, 566 N.E.2d 1119
(Mass. 1991).
Gruner suggests that Massachusetts does not follow a standard Liberal Rule,
and refers instead to the "Beneficial Finance" rule as a third way distinct both
from the federal scope-of-employment rule and from the MPC "high managerial
employee" sort of rule. See Gruner, supra note 66, § 7.03, at 7-11 to 7-14.
However, Massachusetts courts since Beneficial Finance have restated their rule
in terms indistinguishable from the federal rule. See, e.g., Angelo Todesca, 842
N.E.2d at 938 (referring to "acts ...performed by corporate employees, acting
within the scope of their employment and on behalf of the corporation").
110. Kansallis Finance Ltd. v. Fern, 659 N.E.2d 731, 737-38 (Mass. 1996). But see
Trinh v. Gentle Communications, LLC, 881 N.E.2d 1177, 1184 n.9 (Mass. App.
Ct. 2008) (favorably quoting Kolstad).
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Jurisdiction

Liberal Rule for
Criminal Law

Liberal Rule for
Punitive Damages

Nebraska

Mueller (1985)111

New Hampshire

Zeta Chi (1997)115

Liberal Rule presumed;
Punitive damages only
under statute 1 1 3 and
money must
go to
114
schools
Vratsenes (1972);116
1 17
No punitive damages,
but "enhanced
compensatory damages"
for
118
malicious torts

Oklahoma

Liberal Rule presumed

1 19

Bierman (2008)120

Liberal Rule presumed

12 1

Liberal Rule presumed;
Punitive damages
only
12 3
under statute

Puerto Rico

1 12

122

111. Mueller v. Union Pac. R.R., 220 Neb. 742, 750-51, 371 N.W.2d 732, 738 (1985);
State v. Roche, Inc., 2 Neb. App. 445, 453-56, 511 N.W.2d 195, 200-01 (Ct. App.
1994), rev'd on other grounds, 246 Neb. 568, 520 N.W.2d 539 (1994).
112. E.g., State ex rel. Stenberg v. Am. Midlands, Inc., 244 Neb. 887, 892-93, 509
N.W.2d 633, 636-37 (1994).
113. See Abel v. Conover, 170 Neb. 926, 930-32, 104 N.W.2d 684, 688 (1960).
114. See Id. at 933, 104 N.W.2d at 689 (double or treble damages violate NEB. CONST.
art. VII, § 5).
115. State v. Zeta Chi Fraternity, 696 A.2d 530, 534-35 (N.H. 1997); State v.
Pinardville Athletic Club, 594 A.2d 1284, 1286 (N.H. 1991).
116. Vratsenes v. N. H. Auto, Inc., 289 A.2d 66, 67-68 (N.H. 1972); Bixby v. Dunlap,
56 N.H. 456, 463, 1876 WL 5269, at *6 (N.H. 1876) (following Goddard);Hopkins
v. Atl. & Saint Lawrence R.R., 36 N.H. 9, 17-18, 1857 WL 2820, at *7 (N.H.
1857).
117. Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 383, 1872 WL 4394, at *42 (N.H. 1872).
118. Figlioli v. R.J. Moreau Companies, Inc., 866 A.2d 962, 966 (N.H. 2005).
119. Statutes and cases allow corporate criminal liability without suggesting a foodchain limit. See Hardeman King Co. v. State, 233 P. 792, 792 (Okla. Crim. App.
1925); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 105 (West 2003 & Supp. 2007); id. tit. 21,
§ 187.2 (West 2003 & Supp. 2007); id. tit. 21, § 331 (West 2003); id. tit. 21,
§ 839.1 (West 2003 & Supp. 2007); id. tit. 21, § 839.1A (West Supp. 2007); id. tit.
21, § 918 (West 2003 & Supp. 2007); id. tit. 21, § 1513 (West 2003); id. tit. 22,
§ 516 (West 2003 & Supp. 2007); id. tit. 22, §§ 1301-1308.
120. Bierman v. Aramark Refreshment Services, Inc., No. 104421-104434, 2008 WL
867329, at *4 (Okla. April 1, 2008).
121. Statutes authorize corporate criminal liability without suggesting a food-chain
limit. See P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 33, § 3174 (2001); Pueblo v. Mena Peraza, 13 P.R.
Offic. Trans. 356, 1982 WL 210571 (P.R. 1982); Coll. of Engrs and Sewers of P.R
v. P.R. Aqueduct and Sewer Auth., 131 P.R. Dec. 735, 1992 WL 755500 (P.R.
1992); see also P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 33, §§ 3241-46 (2001) (authorizing the
sentencing of corporations without suggesting a food-chain limit).
122. The civil rights statute allows corporate punitive damages without suggesting a
food-chain limit. See P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 1, § 13(e) (1999); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 1,
§ 14 (1999); Garcia Pagan v. Shiley Caribbean, 22 P.R. Offic. Trans. 183, 191
(P.R. 1988).
123. P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 31, § 1260b(1) (Supp. 2004).
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Jurisdiction
South Carolina
Tennessee
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Liberal Rule for
Criminal LA

liaRle Damages.
for
Puitv

Liberal Rule presumed 124

Hooper (1931)125

Louisville & Northern (1892)126

Odom (1974)127

Table 4: Consistently Liberal Jurisdictions.

B.

Consistently Restrictive Jurisdictions

Jurisdiction

Restrictive R ule for
Criminal Law

Colorado

strcte'ul.

Statute, MPC, 1 2 8 supervisors or

policymakers;1

29

But see Overland Cotton (1904),

Liberal Rule 130

for

1Mm
Dmages

:tie.

Holland Furnace
(1965), 5R
13

Problem;

1

Roget (1999),

Restatement

13 2

124. Statutes allow corporate criminal liability without suggesting a food-chain limit.
See S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-25-320 (2003); id. § 16-17-30 (2003); id. § 40-5-320(A)
(2001 & Supp. 2007).
125. Hooper v. Hutto, 158 S.E. 726, 727 (S.C. 1931); Reeves v. S. Ry., 46 S.E. 543, 545
(S.C. 1904); Hill v. USA Truck, Inc., No. 8:06-CV-1010-GRA, 2007 WL 1574545,
at *1-*2 (D.S.C May 30, 2007).
126. State v. Louisville & N. R.R. Co., 19 S.W. 229, 229 (Tenn. 1892).
127. Odom v. Gray, 508 S.W.2d 526, 533 (Tenn. 1974).
128. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-606(1)(b) (2007) (mandating that business entities are
guilty if an offense is committed by "the governing body or individual authorized
to manage the affairs of the business entity or by a high managerial agent acting
within the scope of his or her employment or in behalf of the business entity.").
129. Id. § 18-1-606(1)(b)-(2)(a).
130. Overland Cotton Mill Co. v. People, 75 P. 924, 926 (Colo. 1904).
131. Holland Furnace Co. v. Robson, 402 P.2d 628, 631 (Colo. 1965) ("The principal
cannot be held liable in exemplary damages for the act of an agent, unless it is
shown that it authorized or approved the act for which exemplary damages are
claimed; or, that it approved of or participated in the wrong of its agent; or, that it
failed to exercise proper care in selecting its servants.").
132. Roget v. Grand Pontiac, Inc., 5 P.3d 341, 346 (Colo. Ct. App. 1999); Fitzgerald v.
Edelen, 623 P.2d 418, 423 (Colo. Ct. App. 1980).
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Delaware

Statute, MPG; 1 3 3 no definition

Brandt (2006),1 3 4
Restatement;
Lankford Signs (1998),
"corporate officers;" 1 3 5
DiStefano3(1985),
5R
6
Problem;1
But see McLane
(1838),
13 7
Liberal Rule

Guam

Statute, MPC,' 3 8
139
policymakers

Park (2004), Restatement,
40
policymakersl

133. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 281(2) (2001 & Supp. 2006).
134. Brandt v. Rokeby Realty Co., 2006 WL 1942314, at *22 (Del. Super. Ct. July 7,
2006); Ramada Inns, Inc. v. Dow Jones & Co., 1988 WL 15825, at *1-*2 (Del.
Super. Ct. Feb. 9, 1988). Ramada later described the law in a way posing the 5R
Problem. See infra note 136.
135. Lankford Signs, Inc. v. Tennefoss, 1998 WL 1557441, at *5 n.19 (Del. Comm. P1.
Oct. 20, 1998) ("[The corporate defendant] would be responsible for punitive
damages only if corporate officers authorized, participated in or ratified the
conduct not shown here.") (following New Jersey case).
136. DiStefano v. Hercules, 1985 WL 189309, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. Nov. 8, 1985)
("[An employer will not be liable for wilful or wanton conduct of an employee
unless employer ratified or authorized the wilful or wanton actions."); see also
Ramada, 1988 WL 15825 at *5 ("In Delaware, a corporation remains innocent of
wrongdoing even if its employee has been found to have committed a tort and
some further fault on the part of the corporation is necessary before the award of
punitive damages is proper.").
137. See McLane v. Sharpe, 2 Harr. 481, 482-84, 1838 WL 171, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct.
1838); see also Ford v. Charles Warner Co., 37 A. 39, 41-42 (Del. Super. Ct. 1893)
(citing McLane). The Delaware Supreme Court has suggested that Ford was
wrong to allow punitive damages for gross negligence, but without suggesting
that its food-chain analysis, or that of McLane, was wrong. Jardel Co., Inc. v.
Hughes, 523 A.2d 518, 530 n.9 (Del. 1987).
138. GuAM CODE ANN. tit. 9, § 4.80(a)(1) (1996) ("A corporation may be convicted of...
any offense committed in furtherance of its affairs on the basis of conduct
performed, authorized, requested, commanded or recklessly tolerated by ... the
board of directors; [or] a managerial agent acting in the scope of his employment
139. Id. tit. 9, § 4.80(c) ("[Mlanagerial agent means an agent of the corporation having
duties of such responsibility that his conduct may fairly be found to represent the
policy of the corporation.").
140. Park v. Mobil Oil Guam, Inc., 2004 Guam 20, 2004 WL 2595897, at *9 (Guam
2004) ("[A] managerial agent under the Restatement is an employee who
exercises substantial discretionary authority which results in the ad hoc
formulation of policy over an aspect of the corporation's business.").
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Hawaii

Statute, MPC,' 4 1 no definition

Beerman (1980),
5R
14 2
Problem

Idaho

Adjustment Deptartment (1971),
143
supervisors or policymakers

Openshaw (1971),
144
Restatement

141. HAw. REV. STAT. § 702-227(2) (1993) (referring to the actions of "the board of
directors of the corporation or . . . the executive board of the unincorporated
association or by a high managerial agent acting within the scope of the agent's
office or employment and in behalf of the corporation or the unincorporated
association.").
142. Beerman v. Toro Mfg. Corp., 615 P.2d 749, 755 (Haw. Ct. App. 1980) ("We note
that there are Hawaii Supreme Court cases holding that punitive damages may
be recovered against corporate defendants ... only if the corporations expressly
or impliedly authorized the allegedly tortious act before or after it was
committed.").
143. State v. Adjustment Dep't. Credit Bureau, Inc., 483 P.2d 687, 691 (Idaho 1971).
Adjustment Department is one of the only cases in this survey that makes contact
between corporate punitive damages and corporate crime. See infra note 268.
However, the state still uses differently-worded rules for the two areas of law.
144. Openshaw v. Or. Auto. Ins. Co., 487 P.2d 929, 932 n. 3 (Idaho 1971); Boise Dodge,
Inc. v. Clark, 453 P.2d 551, 554-55 (Idaho 1969). There is language in some
cases indicating that both managerial employees and directors must be involved.
See Student Loan Fund, Inc. v. Duerner, 951 P.2d 1272, 1280 (Idaho 1997) ("A
corporation is liable for punitive damages based upon the acts of its agents if the
directors and managing officers participated in, or authorized or ratified, the
agents' acts.") (emphasis added); Openshaw, 487 P.2d at 932 ("To be entitled to an
award of punitive damages against a corporation the complaining party must
show that.., its directors and managing officers.. . participated in or authorized
or ratified the agent's acts."); Manning v. Twin Falls Clinic & Hosp., Inc., 830
P.2d 1185, 1192 (Idaho 1992) (quoting Openshaw).
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Rstrictive Rule for
Pniive Damages
Statute, MPC,1 4L 46
policymakers

Mattyasovszky (1975),
Restatement;147

Horgan14
(2000),
"superior
8
officer;"
Kemner (1991),1 4 9
policymakers;
But see Singer (1877),

Liberal Rule 150

Iowa

Statute, supervisors or
5
policymakersl l

Briner (1983),1 5 2
Restatement

145. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-4(a)(2) (West 2002 & Supp. 2007); see also Morris
v. Ameritech Illinois, 785 N.E.2d 62, 67-68 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) (disallowing
liability of corporate "high managerial agent" for an employee's eavesdropping
where superiors did not actually know of eavesdropping); People v. O'Neil, 550
N.E.2d 1090, 1098 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (stating that a corporation is criminally
responsible for offenses authorized, requested, commanded, or performed by a
high managerial agent whenever the managerial agent possesses the requisite
mental state and the criminal offense was within the scope of employment).
146. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-4(c)(2) (West 2002 & Supp. 2007).
147. Mattyasovszky v. West Towns Bus Co., 330 N.E.2d 509, 512 (Ill. 1975); Tolle v.
Interstate Sys. Truck Lines, Inc., 356 N.E.2d 625, 627 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976);
Kemner v. Monsanto Co., 576 N.E.2d 1146, 1156 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991); Jannotta v.
Subway Sandwich Shops, Inc., 125 F.3d 503, 513-14 (7th Cir. 1997); Kennan v.
Checker Taxi Co., 620 N.E.2d 1208, 1212-13 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993). One
formulation from Tolle, though it also quotes the Restatement, poses a 5R
Problem. See 356 N.E.2d at 627 ("[D]eliberate corporate participation should be
shown before this sanction [punitive damages] is applied."). For another
formulation with a 5R Problem, see Mercury Skyline Yacht Charters v. Dave
Matthews Band, Inc., 2005 WL 3159680, at *14 (N.D. Ill. 2005) ("To establish the
requisite corporate complicity for an award of punitive damages, the plaintiff
must offer a basis to find that there has been 'deliberate corporate participation.'"
(citing Kennan, 620 N.E.2d at 1212)).
148. Hargan v. S.W. Elec. Co-op., Inc., 725 N.E.2d 807, 810-11 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000)
("The corporate-complicity rule allows for the imposition of punitive damages
against a corporation if a superior officer of the corporation ordered, participated
in, or ratified outrageous conduct on the part of an employee.").
149. Kemner, 576 N.E.2d at 1157-58 (relying on cases from civil procedure and labor
law, citing Ill. State Journal-Register, Inc. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., 412 F.2d
37, 41-42 (7th Cir. 1969)); Heater v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 497 F.2d 1243,
1248 (7th Cir. 1974); Bd. of Educ. v. Ill. Educ. Labor Relations Bd., 493 N.E.2d
1130, 1137-38 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986)).
150. Singer Mfg. Co. v. Holdfodt, 86 Ill. 455, 458-59, 1877 WL 9757, at *2 (Ill. 1877);
see Am. Soc'y of Mech. Eng'rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 575 n.14
(1982) (citing Singer as emblematic of "the trend of late 19th-century decisions").
151. IOWA CODE ANN. § 703.5(2) (West 2003); State v. Casey's Gen. Stores, Inc., 587
N.W.2d 599 (Iowa 1998) (following rule from Idaho's Adjustment Department).
152. Briner v. Hyslop, 337 N.W.2d 858, 867 (Iowa 1983) (one of the few cases to
attempt a comprehensive review of the division of authority on corporate punitive
damages).
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Kentucky

Statute, MP(,1 154
policyimakers, 5

Statute, 5R Problem;t55
Northeast Health
Management (2001),

Minnesota

Christv Pontiac.GMC(1984),
Corporate a1agaet/co'porate
pol icy 157

supervisors156

Statute, Restatement;
'TennantCo. (1984),
policymakers159

1 58

153. KN. RE.v. STAx. ANN. § 502.050(1)(b) (West 2006 & Supp. 2007).
154. Id. § 502.050(2)(b).
155. ld. § 111.184(30 ("In no case shall punitive damages be assessed against a
principal or emtployer for the act of an agent or employee unless such principal or
emiployer authorized or ratified or should have anticipated the conduct in
question."). Another part of the samc statute was struck down as
un(onstitutional in Williams v. Wilson, 972 S.W.2d 260 (Ky. 1998), but this
provision has not been challenged. See Berrier v. Bizer, 57 S.W.3d 271, 283 84
(Ky. 2001). For other applications of the statute that (10 little to help elarit~' the
51 Problem, see Jones v. Blankenship, No. 6:00-109, 2007 WI, 3400115, at *3 *'
(E.). Ky. Nov. 13, 2007); McGonigle v. Whitehawk, 481 F. Supp. 2d 835, 811 12
(W.) Ky. 2007); Estate of Presley v. CCS of Conway, No. 3:03CVI-117-I, 2004
WL 1179418, at *4 (W.D. Ky. May 18, 2004); Steinhoff v. Upriver Rest. Joint
Venture, 117 F. Supp. 2d 598, 605 (,1). Ky. 2000); Ky. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins.
(o. v. Troxell, 959 S.W.2d 82, 85-86 (Ky. 1997); Kroger Co. v. Willgruber, 920
S.V.2d 61, 68 (Ky. 1996).
156. Ne. Ilealth hMgmt., Inc. v. Cotton, 56 S.W.3d 4,10, 449 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001);
Simpson (ounty Steeplechase Ass'n, Inc. v. Roberts, 898 S.V.2d 523, 527 (Ky. CL.
App. 1995); sce athso Kroger Co, v. Willgruber, 920 S.W.2d 61, 68 (Ky. 1996) (citing
KY. Ei. v. STAT.. ANN. § 411.181(3)).
157. State v. Christy Plontiac-(1MC, Inc., 354 N.W.2d 17, 19 20 (Minn. 1984); State v.
Compa ssionate IHome Care, Inc., 639 N.W.2d 393, 396 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002).
158. MINN. SIAT. ANN. § 549.20 (West 2000 & Supp. 2007); see also Muehlstedt v. ('ity
oflino ILakes, 173 N.W.2d 892, 896 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) ("By statute, punitive
dam ages cal propr'ly be avarded against ai employer if the employee worked in
a manaterial capacity and acted in the scope of employment.").
159. Se Tennant Co. v. Advance Mach, Co., Inc., 355 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Miun. Ct App.
1981); Workman v. Serrano, 2006 WL 771580, at *9 (itn. Ct. App. 2006).
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Criminal Lw
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New Jersey

Statute, due-diligence defense 1 6 0

Lehmann (1993),1 upper
16
management;
Cavuoti (1999),6 2
policymakers1

New York

Statute, MPC, 1 6 3 supervisors or
policymakers 1 6 4

Loughry (1986), "superior
officer," 1 6 5 "institutional
conscience," 1 6 6 "a high
level of general managerial
16 7
authority;"
Zurich Insurance (1994),
those representing 1 6 8
"corporate culture"

160. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-7(a)(1) (West 2005) (allowing punishment for minor
employees' misbehavior); id. § 2C:2-7(c) (West 2005) (stating that for crimes
included in (a)(1), "it shall be a defense if the defendant proves by a
preponderance of evidence that the high managerial agent having supervisory
responsibility over the subject matter of the offense employed due diligence to
prevent its cobmmission").
161. Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153 (3d Cir. 1993) ("The company
official committing, approving or ratifying the act need not be the highest officer
in the corporate hierarchy, but only must be a 'person of such responsibility as to
arouse the "institutional conscience""') (New Jersey law) (quoting statement of
New York law in Doralee Estates, Inc. v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 569 F.2d 716, 722
(2d Cir. 1977)); Cavuoti v. New Jersey Transit Corp., 735 A.2d 548, 554 (N.J.
1999); Lehmann v. Toys R Us, Inc., 626 A.2d 445, 464 (N.J. 1993).
162. Cavuoti, 735 A.2d at 559-61.
163. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 20.20(2)(b) (McKinney 2004 & Supp. 2008).
164. Id. § 20.20(1)(b).
165. Loughry v. Lincoln First Bank, 494 N.E.2d 70, 74-75 (N.Y. 1986); see also
Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 842 (2d Cir. 1967) (noting
that punitive damages are not imposed on a corporation unless management
authorized, participated in, consented to, or ratified the conduct giving rise to
damages); Tse v. UBS Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 03 Civ. 6234(GEL), 2008 WL 463719,
at *33 n.31 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 19, 2008); 1 Mott Street, Inc. v. Con Edison, 823
N.Y.S.2d 375, 376 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006) (citing Loughry); Orange, Rockland
Utilities, Inc. v. Muggs Pub, Inc., 739 N.Y.S.2d 610, 611 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002)
(citing Loughry).
166. Loughry, 494 N.E.2d at 76.
167. Id.
168. Zurich Ins. Co. v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 642 N.E.2d 1065, 1070 (N.Y.
1994).
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___

___

North Dakota

_

lstrictiv Rule for
Crimtinal Law
Statute, supervisors or
9
policymakers 16

Restrictive Rule for
Punitive DaumWee
Rickbeil (1946),
5R
Problem; 170
Mahanna (1961),

"officers;"'171

John Deere (1974), "highly

placed executives," but need
not be officers
or
17 2
directors

169. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-03-02(1) (1997).
170. Rickbeil v. Grafton Deaconess Hosp., 23 N.W.2d 247, 260 (N.D. 1946) ("[P]unitive
damages are not recoverable against the employer, unless he participated in the
wrongful act of the employee, or approved thereof either before or after its
commission."); see also Mahanna v. Westland Oil Co., 107 N.W.2d 353, 363 (N.D.
1961) ("While there is a substantial conflict of authority as to a corporation's
liability for exemplary damages for the acts of its agents[,] it is the settled rule in
this jurisdiction that a corporation is not so liable unless it authorized or ratified
the wrongful act of its agent." (citation omitted)); Voves v. Great Northern Ry.
Co., 143 N.W. 760, 763 (N.D. 1913) (answering no to the question "whether
defendant corporation can be held for punitive damages for the unauthorized and
unratified malicious acts of its employee").
171. Mahanna, 107 N.W.2d at 363.
172. See John Deere Co. v. Nygard Equip., Inc., 225 N.W.2d 80, 95-96 (N.D. 1974).
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I..tvi.tive Un

f.

.o.

IPanlages

Statute, MlC-l us-due
CECOS
diligence; t7:3

Statute,
175 51
ProblemI;2004,

(1 1988)174
h1ternatiotnal

(5 oy (1 977), 51t
Problen, l176
But see Atlantic Railway

(1869), Liberal lule

77

173. (Iio 16-v. Coj . AN. § 2901.23(A)') (LexisNexis1996) tasic MP('-style rue);
id. § 2901.23(( (lexisNexis 1996) (due-diligence d(etonse). This (efense does not
apply to strict liability offenses. AS noted above, the MP(' has a due-diigence
(toItense, but it only applies to minor crimlies fbr which any employee's actions
establish a prima lotie affirm ative case Thee is perhaps a slight inongruity in)
allowing a defense based on the actions ot Ihigh mnOlial e hylovees when we
place. For
are tocused oil misbeh'avior by a high managerial employee in the tirst
more oni layering a due-diligence defen se on top an impi-tnce-oteophye
defense, see the discussion of Kolstad, supra subsection III.B.I.
17,4.State v.CECOS lnt', Inc., 526 N..2d 807, 811 (Ohio 198M; State n )A.Maste"
C'lean, Inc., 704 N.E2d 301, 306 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997) (high inanagerial
emoployces distinguished by "policymaking authority over the area at iss-,e..
v. Cone. ANN. §2315.21(C)(1) (ILexisNcxis 2005) ("[Plunitive 0r
175. (i)o(i
ry dam
iages are not recoverable f'oiTa defendant in question in a tort
exela
action unless ... tIhe actions or oissions o that defendant dmnonstiate malice
or aggravated or egregious firaud, or that dtendant as principal or inaster
or ratiied actions or oissiios of an agent
know ingly outhoriped, articipated in,
or Solrvant t hat so demionstrate.").
106. (i ay v. Allison Di'., Gel. Motors Corp., 370 N.I2d 747, 752 (Ohio t.APp. 1977)
("The eni)loyer is not to be punished for the p1sonal guiIt of his servant or a'01nt
participated in the w on.gloin0g.'); ow
unless the eniployer authorized, ratified olri
a/so (ohlumbus Ry., ower & tight o. v. lurison, 143 N.E. 32, 32 (Ohio 1921)
SIAIs punitive damiages are recoverable only tr guilty motive, or for want n and
0aliciols Tmisconduct, they should not 1e allowed against tihe principal or roaster
is alleged nor
his parit
ill cass wler no Such imotive, wanltoiil Tless, or 1alice uponl
shownY"); i., 143 N.E. at 33 (following Loae Shore), Brief of Appellaits at 28,
Pryinas v. Kassai, 858 N.E.2d 1209 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006 (No. 0.5-087114), 2006
MR, 3368507 ('It is 'wl-established in Ohio that pun itviv domages ilay not be
recovered against a Corporation in te absence ofhevidence that tihe corporation
authorized, participated in,consented to, acquiesced in, or ratitied the malicious
or outrageous conduct of its Temployees."). Icpite the 51Z Problem, those courts
did allow corporate punitive damages. Gray, 370 N.E.2d at 753.
177. Atl. & Great W. l3y. Co. v. iunn, 19 Ohio St. 162, 167 69 tOhio 189
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Restrictive Rule for
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Texas

Statute, MPC, 1 7 8
policymakers 1 7 9

Utah

Statute, MPC, 1 8 2 no definition

Restrictive Rule for
Punitive Damages
Fort Worth Elevators (1934),
"vice principals," hiring and
firing or running
180
department or division;
Hammerly Oaks (1997),
1 81
Restatement
Johnson (1988),
183
Restatement

178. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 7.22 (Vernon 2003 & Supp. 2007). Before the legislature
acted, "for years Texas was the only jurisdiction in which corporations bore no
general criminal responsibility .... " Vaughan and Sons, Inc. v. State, 737 S.W.2d
805, 810 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).
179. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 7.21(2)(b)-(c) (Vernon 2003 & Supp. 2007).
180. Hammerly Oaks, Inc. v. Edwards, 958 S.W.2d 387, 391 (Tex. 1997) (citing Fort
Worth Elevators, 70 S.W.2d 397, 402-03 (Tex. 1934)); Smith v. Kansas City S.,
No. 2:06-CV-291, 2008 WL 276394, at *7 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 30, 2008); 20801, Inc. v.
Parker, 249 S.W.3d 392, 398-99 (Tex. 2008); GTE Sw., Inc. v. Bruce, 998 S.W.2d
605, 618 (Tex. 1999); Purvis v. Prattco, Inc., 595 S.W.2d 103, 105 (Tex. 1980);
Trenton Hood, Comment, It's Ten O'Clock: Do You Know Where Your VicePrincipal Is? The Effect of GTE Southwest, Inc. v. Bruce on Vice-Principal
Liability in Texas, 55 BAYLOR L. REV. 267 (2003).
181. Hammerly Oaks, 958 S.W.2d at 391; King v. McGuff, 234 S.W.2d 403, 405 (Tex.
1950); Fairfield Ins. Co. v. Stephens Martin Paving, LP, 246 S.W.3d 653, 669 n.23
(Tex. 2008).
182. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-204(2) (2003).
183. Johnson v. Rogers, 763 P.2d 771, 778 (Utah 1988); id. at 784 (Zimmerman, J.,
concurring). While the Court adopted the Restatement, one of its formulations
posed a 5R Problem. See id. at 784 (Zimmerman, J., concurring) ("[An employer
may be liable for punitive damages as a result of a tortious act of an employee,
but only so long as that liability is premised on the conduct of the employer. ... ").
The Court said that "[tihe issue of when an employer can be held vicariously
liable for punitive damages because of the acts of nonmanagerial employees is
one of first impression in Utah," 763 P.2d at 776, but later suggested that earlier
law had adopted a Liberal Rule. Hodges v. Gibson Prods. Co., 811 P.2d 151, 163
(Utah 1991).
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West Virginia

Baltimore & Ohio (1909), in
18 4
accord with "the rules;"
Gawthrop (1914), those "a part of
the very life and activity of the
corporation" but not "single,
185
isolated acts"

Baker (1986), 1 8 6
Restatement;
Hains (1915),
5R
18 7
Problem
5R
Karaahmetoglu (2007),
18 8
Problem or "pattern"

Table 5: Consistently Restrictive Jurisdictions.
If we take a closer look at Table 1, but with only the Consistently
Restrictive jurisdictions included, we see that only two of these sixteen jurisdictions (Guam and Minnesota) have adopted the same Restrictive Rule in both fields. Illinois, New Jersey, and New York have
explicitly looser rules for corporate crime than for corporate punitive
damages (Federal Schizophrenia writ small), while the other eleven
states have one rule, or both, that is unclear.

184. State v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 69 S.E. 703, 704 (W. Va. 1910); State v. Balt. &
Ohio R.R. Co., 64 S.E. 735, 735-36 (W. Va. 1909). One case allowing corporate
criminal liability bolstered its view on corporate crime by referring briefly to
corporate punitive damages. State v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 15 W. Va. 362, 1879
WL 2989 (W. Va. 1879).
185. Gawthrop v. Fairmont Coal Co., 81 S.E. 560, 561 (W. Va. 1914).
186. Baker v. Wheat First Securities, 643 F. Supp. 1420, 1428 n.4 (S.D. W. Va. 1986).
187. Hains v. Parkersburg, M. & I. Ry. Co., 84 S.E. 923, 926 (W. Va. 1915) ("[I]t is the
better rule, and more consistent with justice, not to extend the doctrine of
liability for exemplary damages to corporations other than public carriers, unless
the servant's negligence is authorized or ratified . . . ."); Addair v. Huffman, 195
S.E.2d 739, 745 (W. Va. 1973) ("[I]n an agency relationship a master can be liable
for exemplary, as well as compensatory damages through the acts of his servants
'If a master knowingly employs or retains a careless and incompetent
....
servant, he thereby impliedly authorizes or ratifies his negligent acts, committed
in the course of his employment, and, if the servant's negligence is wanton and
willful or malicious, the master is liable for exemplary or punitive damages.'"
(quoting Hains, 84 S.E. at 925)). Hains affirms a punitive damage award against
the corporate defendant on the ground that the defendant ratified the
misbehaving employee's actions by retaining him in employment, but it is not
clear how high in the corporate hierarchy the knowledge of such misbehavior
must go before such retention-based ratification is effective. A corporation might
claim that a mid-level employee's improper retention of a low-level employee was
itself not a corporate act; if ratification is again required of that decision, it is not
clear where the demand for additional ratification legitimately stops, unless
there are some employees whose misbehavior requires no additional ratification.
188. Karaahmetoglu v. Res-Care, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 2d 183, 190 (D.D.C. 2007)
(applying West Virginia law) ("[I]n the absence of a showing by the plaintiff that
[the corporate defendant] acted with malice or that [the victim's] abuse was part
of a pattern of such abuse, the Court will grant summary judgment for the
defendants on the punitive damages claim.").
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Superior Officers

New York
Guam
Kentucky
Minnesota
Texas
Colorado
Idaho

Policymakers

Policymakers or

Illinois

Supervisors

Iowa
New York
North Dakota
New Jersey
West Virginia

Corporate Policy

Guam
Illinois
Minnesota
New Jersey

Corporate

Policy/Managerial
Employee Hybrid

Ohio

Ratification

Colorado
Delaware
Hawaii

Requirement

Kentucky

(MR Problem)

North Dakota
Ohio
West Virginia

No clear definition
of "high managerial

Delaware

agent" or

Hawaii

"managerial agent"
or "manager"

Utah

Idaho

Iowa
Texa

Tas

Table 6: Types of Restrictive Rule in Consistently
Restrictive Jurisdictions.
C.

Federal-Schizophrenic Jurisdictions

Jurisdiction

Liberal Rule for
Criminal Law

Restrictive Rule for
Punitive Damages

Federal law

New York Central & Hudson
(1909);189
Sentencing Guidelines, amount-ofpunishment; 1 9 0
Prosecutorial guidelines 1 9 1

Lake Shore
(1893), 5R
Problem; 1 9 2
Kolstad (1999),
Restatement and GoodFaith-Defense
Hybrid

189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

1 93

See supra subsection II.A.1.
See supra subsection II.B.6.
See supra subsection II.B.7.
See supra subsection II.B.3.
See supra subsection II.B.4. Federal law follows a Liberal Rule for statutory
penalties under antitrust law and the False Claims Act. See Am. Soc'y of Mech.
Eng'rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 566-68 (1982) (antitrust law);
United States v. O'Connell, 890 F.2d 563, 567-69 (1st Cir. 1989) (False Claims
Act); United States v. Hangar One, Inc., 563 F.2d 1155, 1158 (5th Cir. 1977)
(False Claims Act); United States ex rel. Bryant v. Williams Bldg. Corp., 158 F.
Supp. 2d 1001, 1008 (D.S.D. 2001) (False Claims Act).
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4urisdiction

]Aberttl lt~ie 1forl

Alaska

Statute

California

M.T. Grant (1972)

Conecticut

I iberal Rule presumed 99

19,1.

195.
196.

197.

198.
199.
200.

19

":

[Vol. 87:1-97
Rem4rictive Rule for
Staute,
Rstitateent

4
19

6

Statute,
Restatenent; 97
8
WhtUe (1 9 9 9 )19
Maisenboc/er
° (1899).
)
5R lt'oilemt '

A\ ,' x STAT. § 11.16. 130(a;)( l)(A) (2004); id. § I11.16.130(b) (201); see a/so State
v, ABC Towving, 954 P.2d 575, 577 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998) (discussing AiAsKa
STAvi. § 11.16.130(a)(1)).
A xASKA
STAT. § 09.17,020(k) (2004).
W. T. Grant Co, v. Superior Court, 100 Cal. Rptr. 179, 180 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972).
W.G'. Crant relies on a Third (iruit case which in turn vigorously states the
Liberal Rube and denies any sot of food-chain limit on Corporate criminal
liability. See id. at 180 (citing 1.S. v. Armour & Co., 168 F,2d 312, 341 (3d Cir.
ttR.2d 681, 687
1918)); so /so Sea (lorse Ranch, Inc. v. Superior Cournt, 30 (at.
'Cat.Ct. App. 19941) ("In C'alifornia, a co potation tuay be criminally liable for the
conduct of its officers or agents or employees.") (following W.T. Grant). While Sea
floe Ranh follows W. (hunt, which in turn clearly foltlows the INedeat I bral
Rule, it may leave tile door open for a Restrictive Rule fie court notes that the
emnployee at issue "was not a casual or low-level emnployee with 1n tdetisiun
making authority." .30 Cal. Rptr. 2(1 at 687. This may point to a willingness to
alter the ule adtted in W.'. Grant, or may only indicate that the case would tnot
te tne where the Restrictive and liberal Rules would reach different restlts.
One nolprecedential opinion read the "decision-making" language in Sea llorse
as adopting an important restriction. See People v. Mountain Cascade, Inc., 2003
\Vl, 22971131, at *5 (Cal. Ct App. 2003) G;r;ner, however, cites Sea Horse as
endorsing the federal L,iheral Rule. (h;N;.t, suprt note 66, at 7-36 to 08.
CAt- ('iv C(oi,, § 3294(tb) (West 2007 & Supp. 2008). Earlier cases also adopted a
Restrictive Rule. See Egan v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. (o., 620 P.2d 11, 118 ('a.
1979) (policytnaker version of the Restatement's Restrictive Rule); Warner v. S.
Pac. Co., ,45 P. 187, 188 (Cal. 1896).
White v. lltratar, Inc., 88 Cal. Rptr. 2(d 19, 22, 28 (Cal. 1999).
Statutes allow corporate criminal liability and dto not suggest a ttod-chain limit.
See C('NN, GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-3(1) (West 2007); id. § 53-303c; id. § 53a-281.
Maisenbacke;r v. Soc'y Concordia of )anbury, ,12 A. 67, 70 (Corn, 1899) (Ibllmuing
Latke Shore, where "this question is very fully (iiscssed"t; Vanderbut;h v. Nat'l
MR
t(. t assetger Corp., No. 3:06cv585, 2007 WIE 5419740, at 14(). (a,nn. te. 16,
(Conn.
2007) (following M(tisebaekier); Matthiessen v. Vanech, 836 A.2d 394, 41041
2003) (relying ito Maisenbacker in construing statute); Silva v. Arroyo, 1996 W1,
410708, at '2- *3 (Coan. Super. Ct. 1996) (following Aaisenbacker). For th 5It
1toblttem, see Masenbacker, 42 A. at 70 ("As its agent was acting within tile scope
uf his etuployment, the taw conpel.s the defendant to compensate tile Ilaintif ftr
the injuries she has sustained trot the wvrngftl acts of the agent, but it does not
whichiromited the
punish the defendant tar the malicious )1tllutse oratnt
agents conduct. Io render the Ptrincilal liable in exemplary damages fi;t the ats
of his agent it; the course of his employment, but done with such malicious intent,
soe tmisconduct of the fort;er beyond that which tle law implies; frtln the ue;re
relation of principal and agent tuist be shxt."). The Court dot' m)e that
corporate punitive damages are available hit some cases, t! at 69 -70.
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jkurisd i i ti 1

Lilnoral Rttl fill

District of,
Cohumbia

SherpiX ( 1975)

01

IRttrivtive Ruh for
Re'oemis (1980),
"executive oflicer of

high rank" or "general
practices" almouting to
"corporate polcy0'

Floida

West Val. E'states (1973)20 3

'2 0 2

Statute, "offieis,
,
'anagers
directors, or I
2 °
or g0ross negligence; 04

Me, uu,
5H I

11otor.s 1981),
)'oble;205

McArthur"Dairv6 (1986),
RestateIont; 20

Bulahos 7Multiph
(1985)20
Sc/ropp (1995),

managing agent 01
polieytkerl205

United States v. Sherpix, fie., 512 F.2d 1361 ().C. Cir. 1975). The rile is not
perfctly clear as to 1.C. law; the Court applies 1oth fedcral and ).C. law without
suggesting that they follow different rules oo the food-chai issue.
202. Retneikis v. Boss & Phelps, tie., 419 A.2d 986, 992 (1).C. 1980).
203. West Valley Estates, Inc. v. State, 286 So. 2t 208, 209 (la. Dist. Ct. App 1973)
(following Commonwealth v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 275 N.E.2d 33, 80 (Moss. 1971 ));
1ist. Ct. App. 1969).
State v. Mun. Auto Sales, Inc., 222 So. 2d 2/8 (l.
201,

MSyr. ANN. § 768.72(3)(b) (c) (West 2005 & Supp. 2008).
201. F',.\.
an
205. Miercury 'Motors Exp., Inc. v. Smith, 393 So. 2d 545, 549 (Fla. 1981) ("titre
employer nay be held vicariously liable for punitive da ages under th doctrine
of respio/leat superior, there toust be somle fault oi his part.").

206. McArthur )airy, tie. v. Original Kielbs, fie., 481 So. 2d 535, 540 (Fla. 1)ist. Ct.

App. 1986).

207.

Bankers Multiple Line Ins. Co. v. Farish, 464 So. 2d 530, 533 (Fla. 1985)
(M,'rcur Motors "was not intended to apply to situations where the apgeit
primarily causing the imposition of punitive damages was tle managing agent or
primary owner of the corporation."). The defilite article "the maoaging ageot"
has been taken in some cases to require it vt)3' high po s ition in tthe corporate

hierarchy. See Capital Book Y.MVI,, Joe., 641 So. 2(t 515, 521 (Fh. IlNs! Ct. App.
1991) ("[The misbehaving employee] was nut the managing agent or primary
One of several bank vice-presidents, [hel was not a1
owne of tMe bank ....
mooler of the Jfoard of Directors or the loan committee." (citation omitted)); see
aso l'ietr 66 Co. v. oulos, 542 So. 2d 377, 381 (Mla. ist. Ct. App. 1989) (MYTlhe
II)ishehavitg emliployee] was only the hotel manager for [the corporate owner of
hotell; he was clearly not a managing agent of [the owner of the corporate Owner
of the Iotel.').
JIe., 654 So. 2( 1158, 1161 (Ma. 1995). For citicism
208. Schropp v. Crown Eoars,
of Schrop its ar misinterpretation of Bankers Multiple, see Ted C. Craig &
Christol)her N. Johnson, WIn sA AomgerA MNmaging Agentt?, 75 Fr\. BA. 62,
62, 65 (2001). Craig and Johnson advocate Aollowing Califovia's eases tndr a
Restatement ritle that makes policymaking a key concern, or New York's
at
Md.64 (cummeodiog "weII-reastned
"istittional conscience" Restrictive Rule.
deeisions" in White v. Ultramar, Ine., 981 P.2d 944 ((Ol. 1999), and ouihr3y v.
L,ineoln First Bank, '194 N.E. 2 70, 76 (N.Y. 1986)).
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Jurisdiction

Liberal Rule for
Criminal Law

Restrictive Rule for
Punitive Damages

Kansas

Statute2 09

Statute, 5R
210
Problem;
Smith (1993),

managerial2 1
employees; 1
Kline (1983), 2 12

Restatement;

But see Wheeler &

Wilson
(1887), Liberal
2 13
Rule

209. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3206(1)-(2) (1995).
210. Id. § 60-3702(d) (2005 & Supp. 2006) ("In no case shall exemplary or punitive
damages be assessed pursuant to this section against (1) [a] principal or employer
for the acts of an agent or employee unless the questioned conduct was
authorized or ratified by a person expressly empowered to do so on behalf of the
principal or employer; or (2) an association, partnership or corporation for the
acts of a member, partner or shareholder unless such association, partnership or
corporation authorized or ratified the questioned conduct."). Because of the 5R
Problem, it is not clear what level employee can "expressly empower" another
employee to ratify or authorize misbehavior.
211. Smith v. Printup, 866 P.2d 985, 1003-1004 (Kan. 1993).
212. Kline v. Multi-Media Cablevision, Inc., 666 P.2d 711, 714-16 (Kan. 1983).
213. Wheeler & Wilson Mfg. Co. v. Boyce, 13 P. 609, 610 (Kan. 1887).

2008]
Jurisdiction
Mississippi

PUNISHING CORPORATIONS
Liberal Rule for
Criminal Law
Liberal Rule presumed 2 14

Restrictive Rule for
Punitive Damages
Gamble (2003), 2 15
corporate policy;
But see Pullman
(1897),
2 16
Liberal Rule

214. Edward Hines Yellow Pine Trs. v. State, 94 So. 231, 232 (Miss. 1922), allows
corporate criminal liability without suggesting a food-chain limit.
215. In Gamble ex rel. Gamble v. Dollar Gen. Corp., 852 So. 2d 5 (Miss. 2003), the
Court affirmed compensatory damages. Id. at 14. Thus finding that the
misbehaving employee acted in the scope of employment, but reversed punitive
damages because his actions were contrary to corporate policy expressed in an
employee handbook. Id. at 15; see also Doe ex rel. Doe v. Salvation Army, 835 So.
2d 76, 81 (Miss. 2003) (distinguishing a case addressing "scope of employment in
a general context and not in terms of punitive damages" from a statute that
applies "[in the punitive damage context"). However, the misbehaving employee
was outside the scope of his employment. Id. at 81 ("[The Salvation Army, the
corporate defendant,] is a Christian organization that promotes the Scriptures
and God, not sexual assault on minors. [The misbehaving employee] was clearly
not acting within the scope of his employment with [the Salvation Army] at the
time of the assault ....

[I]t cannot be said that [the misbehaving employee's]

actions were within the scope of his employment as a counselor .... Assaulting
young boys has nothing to do with the goals and doctrines of [the Salvation Army]
and its Christian philosophy."). Compensatory damages were awarded against
the corporate defendant for negligent supervision, not the actions of the
assaulting employee. Id. at 77.
Gamble and Doe relied on Mississippi's punitive damages statute, Miss. CODE
ANN. § 11-1-65 (West 1999), which requires that a defendant misbehave in one of
a number of ways before punitive damages may be imposed. The Liberal Rule
would not disagree, however, with that proposition, but would only hold that the
actions even of minor employees within the scope of their employment are the
actions of the corporate employer. One dissenting judge has suggested that by
referring to misbehavior by a defendant, the statute adopts a ratification
requirement; if it did, it would have a 5R Problem. See Duggins v. Guardianship
of Washington Through Huntley, 632 So. 2d 420, 433 (Miss. 1993) (Lee, J.,
dissenting) ("[Olur legislature has recently mandated that punitive damages are
only proper where 'the defendant against whom punitive damages are sought' has
acted with actual malice, gross negligence, etc .....
This statute absolutely
forecloses vicarious liability for punitive damages in actions arising after the
effective date." (quoting Gardner v. Jones 464 So. 2d 1144, 1149 (Miss. 1985)
(emphasis in original))). Several federal district courts have picked up the idea.
Bradley v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 2:04cv360JMR-JMR, 2006 WL 2792338, at
*4 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 27, 2006) (citing Duggins for an "absolutely forecloses
vicarious liability for punitive damages" reading of § 11-1-65, not noting that it
appears in a dissent); see also Francois v. Colonial Freight Sys., Inc., No. 3:06-cv434-WHB-LRA, 2007 WL 4459073, at *4 (S.D. Miss. Dec. 14, 2007) (following
Bradley); Decanter v. Builders Transp., Inc., No. 3:95CV134-B-A, 1996 WL
408844, *2 (N.D. Miss. July 11, 1996) (following Duggins dissent).
216. See Pullman Palace-Car Co. v. Lawrence, 22 So. 53, 57-58 (Miss. 1897) (applying
Illinois law). Pullman is frequently quoted and cited. For cases quoting Pullman
at length, see for example Miller v. Blanton, 210 S.W.2d 293, 296-97 (Ark. 1948);
Little Rock Ry. & Elec. Co. v. Dobbins, 95 S.W. 788, 792 (Ark. 1906); Mayo Hotel
Co. v. Danciger, 288 P. 309, 312-13 (Okla. 1930). For cases citing Pullman, see
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Jurisdiction

Liberal Rule for
Criminal Law

Restrictive Rule for
Punitive Damages

Nevada

Liberal Rule presumed 2 1 7

Smith's Food & Drug
2 18
(1998), Restatement;
Nittinger (2003),
2 19
policymakers

New Mexico

Liberal Rule presumed 2 2 0

Albuquerque Concrete
(1994), Restatement,
22 1
policymakers

North Carolina

Ice & Fuel (1914)222

Statute, "officers,
directors, or2 2 3
managers"

Rhode Island

Eastern Coal (1908)224

AAA Pool Service &
Supply (1984),
5R
22 5
Problem

217.
218.

219.

220.
221.
222.
223.

224.
225.

for example Am. Soc. of Mech. Eng'rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 575
n.14 (1982) (citing Pullman as emblematic of "the trend of late 19th century
decisions"); S. Pac. Co. v. Boyce, 223 P. 116, 120 (Ariz. 1924); see also Sandifer Oil
v. Dew, 71 So. 2d 752, 758 (Miss. 1954) (apparently utilizing the Liberal Rule);
Rivers v. Yazoo & M. V. R. Co., 43 So. 471, 472 (Miss. 1907) (following this
reasoning in the context of slander); Alfred G. Nichols, Jr., Comment, Punitive
Damages in Mississippi:A Brief Survey, 37 Miss. L.J. 131, 149 (1965) (stating
that Mississippi follows the broad Liberal Rule).
Statutes presuppose corporate criminal liability without imposing any food-chain
limit. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 193.160 (2007) (sentencing provision for
corporations).
Smith's Food & Drug Ctrs., Inc. v. Bellegarde, 958 P.2d 1208, 1214 (Nev. 1998)
("We take this opportunity to clarify this aspect of our punitive damages
jurisprudence. We now exclusively embrace the Restatement... approach with
regard to an employer's liability for punitive damages for the acts or omissions of
its agents . . ").
Nittinger v. Holman, 69 P.3d 688, 691-92 (Nev. 2003) (following California
cases); Izpuierdo v. Circus Circus Casinos, Inc., No. 2:06-cv-01093-RCJ-RJJ, 2008
WL 763224, at *3 (D. Nev. March 19, 2008) ("The fact that [an employee] was a
supervisor is not enough to grant him status as a managing agent.").
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-1-2(E) (LexisNexis 2000) authorizes corporate criminal
liability without imposing any food-chain limit.
Albuquerque Concrete Coring Co., v. Pan Am World Servs., Inc., 879 P.2d 772,
777 (N.M. 1994) (quoting Egan v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 620 P.2d 141, 148 (Cal.
1979) and Abshire v. Stoller, 601 N.E.2d 1257, 1263 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992)).
State v. Ice & Fuel Co., 81 S.E. 737, 738 (N.C. 1914).
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1D-15(c) (West 2003) ("Punitive damages may be
awarded against a person only . . . if, in the case of a corporation, the officers,
directors, or managers of the corporation participated in or condoned the conduct
constituting the aggravating factor giving rise to punitive damages.").
State v. E. Coal Co., 70 A. 1, 7 (R.I. 1908) (agreeing that "criminal intent will be
imputed to the corporation from acts done by its agents").
AAA Pool Serv. & Supply, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 479 A.2d 112, 116 (R.I.
1984) ("[P]unitive or exemplary damages will not be allowed in situations in
which a 'principal is prosecuted for the tortious act of his servant, unless there is
proof in the cause to implicate the principal and make him particeps criminis of
his agent's act.'" (quoting Hagan v. Providence & Worcester R.R. Co., 3 R.I. 88, 91
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PUNISHING CORPORATIONS
Liberal Rule for

Restritive Rule for

Criminal Law

Punitive Damages

South Dakota

Botsford Lumber (1914)226

Dahl (1991), 2 2 7
Restatement

Vermont

Vermont Central (1854)228

Staruski (1990),
2 29
Restatement

(1854))). The court noted that Hagan had been followed in Lake Shore, without
noting Lake Shore's "brought home to the corporation" rule. Id.; see also
Palmisano v. Toth, 624 A.2d 314, 321 (R.I. 1993) ("[Olur rule would not permit a
jury to award punitive damages on a respondeat-superior theory."); Shoucair v.
Brown Univ., 917 A.2d 418, 434 (R.I. 2007) (similar discussion).
226. State ex rel. Botsford Lumber Co. v. Taylor, 147 N.W. 72, 73 (S.D. 1914) (citing
United States v. Alaska Packers' Ass'n & Babler, 1 Alaska 217, 1901 WL 312 (D.
Alaska 1901) for the proposition that corporations may be indicted); Alaska
Packers, 1 Alaska at 219, 1901 WL 312, at *1 ("[A] corporation may be punished
upon indictment for a felony as it may for a misdemeanor."); id. at 220, 1901 WL
312 at *2 (quoting the same statement from 2 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, NEW
COMMENTARIES ON CRIMINAL LAW UPON A NEW SYSTEM OF LEGAL EXPOSITION
§ 417 (8th ed. 1892) quoted in N.Y. Cent. & Hudson R.R. Co. v. United States, 212
U.S. 481 (1909)). Botsford Lumber itself cites "Bishop's New Crim. Proc. § 417" in
support of the proposition that corporations can be indicted. However, the
reference seems to be to the Liberal Rule stated in Bishop's substantive work on
Criminal Law, because section 417 of his work on criminal procedure is a rule on
indictments and lesser-included offenses. See 1 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, NEW
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, OR, NEW COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF PLEADING AND
EVIDENCE AND THE PRACTICE IN CRIMINAL CASES § 417, at 258 (4th ed. 1895)

(discussing "crime within crime" and not mentioning corporations).
While Botsford Lumber follows N.Y. Cent. & Hudson R.R. Co. and its
reasoning, direct precedents are limited to minor crimes. State v. First Nat'l
Bank of Clark, 51 N.W. 587, 587-88 (S.D. 1892), allows corporate criminal
liability without suggesting a food-chain limit, but is limited to crimes lacking
mens rea elements. A recent case clearly adopts a Liberal Rule with respect to
"certain offenses." State v. Hy Vee Food Stores, Inc., 533 N.W.2d 147, 149 (S.D.
1995) (citing N.Y. Cent. & Hudson R.R. Co.). The court considered and rejected a
suggestion that it adopt a Restrictive Rule, but its reasoning was confined to
regulatory offenses. Hy Vee, 533 N.W.2d at 149-50.
227. Dahl v. Sittner, 474 N.W.2d 897, 903 (S.D. 1991). The punitive-damages case
Wyman v. Terry Schulte Chevrolet, Inc., 584 N.W.2d 103, 106 (S.D. 1998), is one
of the very few that makes contact between the two fields of criminal
punishment, quoting Hy Vee, 533 N.W.2d at 149, though the food-chain issue was
not involved. See Wyman, 584 N.W.2d at 106 ("Although [Hy Vee] pertained to
criminal liability, we find the rule of law also applies here."). However, Wyman
did not acknowledge the Restrictive Rule of Dahl.
228. State v. Vt. Cent. R. Co., 27 Vt. 103, 106-07, 1854 WL 3704 (Vt. 1854).
229. Staruski v. Cont'l Tel. Co., 581 A.2d 266, 273 (Vt. 1990).
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Jurisdiction

Liberal Rule for
Criminal Law

Restrictive Rule for
Punitive Damages

Virginia

Andrews (2003)230

Freeman2 (1963),
5R
31
Problem

Virgin Islands

Liberal Rule presumed 2 3 2

Hendricks (1999),
2 33
Restatement

Wisconsin

Dried Milk Products (1962)234

Mid-Continent
Refrigerator (1970), 5R
23 5
Problem

230. Andrews v. Ring, 585 S.E.2d 780, 787 (Va. 2003); see also Postal Tel.-Cable Co. v.
City of Charlottesville, 101 S.E. 357, 358 (Va. 1919) (same reasoning); Crall v.
Commonweath, 49 S.E. 638, 639-40 (Va. 1905) (same reasoning). One case relied
on Francis Wharton's treatise. Crall,49 S.E. at 640 (citing 1 FRANCIS WHARTON,
A TREATISE ON CRIMINAL LAW § 247, at 272 (9th ed. 1885)). Wharton noted a
scope-of-employment Liberal Rule for corporate crime: "[A]s it is only by agents
that corporations can act, it is not necessary to prove, on charging a corporation
with a criminal act performed by an agent, within his range of duty, that this act
was specifically authorized by the corporation." Id. at 273.
231. Freeman v. Sproles, 131 S.E.2d 410, 414 (Va. 1963) ("The trial court correctly
ruled that the corporate defendants . . .were not liable for punitive damages.
This is true because such damages 'cannot be awarded against a master or
principal for the wrongful act of his servant or agent in which he did not
participate, and which he did not authorize or ratify."') (quoting Hogg v. Plant,
133 S.E. 759, 761 (Va. 1926)). While Freeman has a 5R Problem, the case from
which it takes its rule relies on Lake Shore, suggesting some form of corporate
punitive damages should be available. See Hogg, 133 S.E. at 760 (citing Lake
Shore & Mich. S. Ry. Co. v. Prentice, 147 U.S. 101 (1893)).
See also Doe v. Harris, No. CL5544, 2001 WL 34773877, at *9 (Va. Cir. Ct.
April 11, 2001) ("In Virginia, punitive damages cannot be awarded against an
employer who is vicariously liable unless the employer authorized or ratified the
conduct."); Golesorkhi v. Lufthansa German Airlines, No. 96-2211, 122 F.3d 1061
(Table), 1997 WL 560013, at *2 (4th Cir. 1997) ("[I]n Virginia, a corporation must
authorize or ratify the acts of its employees before punitive damages can be
imposed upon it.").
232. Cases presuppose corporate criminal liability without suggesting a food-chain
limit. See Gov't of V.I. v. O'Brien, 1985 WL 47217 (V.I. Aug. 9, 1985).
233. Hendricks v. Transp. Servs. of St. John, Inc., No. Civ. 626/1995, 1999 WL 395121,
at *7 (V.I. April 26, 1999).
234. State v. Dried Milk Prods. Co-op, 114 N.W.2d 412, 415 (Wis. 1962); see also
Vulcan Last Co. v. State, 217 N.W. 412, 415 (Wis. 1928) (same reasoning); State
v. Richard Knutson, Inc., 537 N.W.2d 420, 425 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995) (same
reasoning).
235. Mid-Continent Refrigerator Co. v. Straka, 178 N.W.2d 28, 33 (Wis. 1970)
(referring to a "well-established line of cases refusing punitive damages in tort
against a corporate defendant without proof that the defendant authorized or
ratified the alleged tortious act of its employee") (citing Garcia v. Samson's, Inc.,
103 N.W.2d 565 (Wis. 1960)); see also Jeffers v. Nysse, 297 N.W.2d 495, 499 n.3
(Wis. 1980) (quoting Mid-Continent Refrigerator, 178 N.W.2d at 33).
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Wyoming

PUNISHING CORPORATIONS
Liberal Rule for
Criminal Law
Liberal Rule presumed 2 36

247

Restrictive,Rule for
Punitive Dmage.
Campen (1981),
23 7
Restatement

Table 7: Federal-SchizophrenicJurisdictions.
D.

Pennsylvania-Schizophrenic Jurisdictions

State

Restrictive Rule for
Criminal Law
Statute, MPC;2 23938
policymakers

Liberal Rule for
Punitive Damages
Haralson (2001)240

Arkansas

Statute, MPC; 24 1 no
definition

J.B. Hunt (1995)242

Georgia

Statute, MPC,
"managerial official," 243
supervisors or2 44
policymakers

Sightler (1993)245

Louisiana

Chapman Dodge (1983),
officers or24board
of
6
directors

Rivera (1997),247 punitive damages
available only under statute

Arizona

236. WYo. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-104(a)(vii) (2007) authorizes corporate criminal liability
without suggesting a food-chain limit.
237. Campen v. Stone, 635 P.2d 1121, 1125 (Wyo. 1981); see also Farmers Ins. Exch. v.
Shirley, 958 P.2d 1040, 1052 (Wyo. 1998) (same reasoning).
238. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-305(A)(2) (2001).

239. Id. § 13-305(B)(2).
240. Haralson v. Fisher Surveying, Inc., 31 P.3d 114, 119-20 (Ariz. 2001).
241. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-502(a)(2) (1997).

242. J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc. v. Doss, 899 S.W.2d 464, 469 (Ark. 1995).
243. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-2-22(a)(2) (2003) ("A corporation may be prosecuted for the
act or omission constituting a crime only if... [t]he commission of the crime is
authorized, requested, commanded, performed, or recklessly tolerated by the
board of directors or by a managerial official who is acting within the scope of his
employment in behalf of the corporation."). Quite oddly, this statute is read as if
it abolishes corporate criminal liability altogether in Byrne v. Nezhat, 261 F.3d
1075, 1105 (11th Cir. 2001) ("Under Georgia law, a corporation qua corporation,
cannot be held to answer for a crime.").
244. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-2-22(b)(2) (2003).
245. Sightler v. Transus, Inc., 430 S.E.2d 81, 81 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993) ("[E]mployers or
principals may be vicariously liable for punitive damages arising from the
misconduct of their employees or agents in Georgia."); see also Gasway v. Atlanta
and W. Point R.R. Co., 58 Ga. 216, 219-20, 1877 WL 2979, at *3-*4 (Ga. 1877)
(following Goddard,"the well considered case"); Johnson v. Allen, 613 S.E.2d 657,
663 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005) (a more current case in the same line).
246. State v. Chapman Dodge Ctr., Inc., 428 So. 2d 413, 419-20 (La. 1983).
247. Rivera v. United Gas Pipeline Co., 697 So. 2d 327, 336 (La. Ct. App. 1997).
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Hock Shop (2004), "high
management
248
officials;"
Lanzo Construction2 4 9
(2006), supervisors
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Joba Construction (1982),250
"non-punitive" characterization
of
251
punitive damages

248. People v. Hock Shop, Inc., 681 N.W.2d 669, 672 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004). The court
in Hock Shop distinguished People v. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc., 438 N.W.2d
359 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989), which found that "a corporation is sufficiently a
'person' to be the perpetrator of a manslaughter." Gen. Dynamics, 438 N.W.2d at
361. This distinguishment was based on the fact that in General Dynamics, the
misbehavior at issue "was [performed] pursuant to [the] policies of the defendant
corporation." Hock Shop, 681 N.W.2d at 672.
249. People v. Lanzo Constr. Co., 726 N.W.2d 746, 753 (Mich. Ct. App. 2006) (following
Hock Shop, 681 N.W.2d at 673, and adopting a test taken from State v.
Adjustment Dep't Credit Bureau, Inc., 483 P.2d 687 (Idaho 1971), which itself
follows from 2 GEORGE D. HORNSTEIN, CORPORATION LAW AND PRACTICE § 566, at
47 (1959)).
250. Joba Constr. Co. v. Burns & Roe Inc., 329 N.W.2d 760, 773-74 (Mich. Ct. App.
1982); see also Ray v. City of Detroit, 242 N.W.2d 494, 496 (Mich. Ct. App. 1976)
(imputed corporate malice follows same rules as imputed corporate negligence).
251. E.g., Ray, 242 N.W.2d at 495 ("The terms 'exemplary' damages, 'punitive'
damages and 'vindictive' damages have frequently been confused or used
interchangeably. However, in Michigan only exemplary damages which are
compensatory in nature are allowable .... They are never allowed, however, for
the purpose of punishing or making an example of a defendant."). This
idiosyncratic understanding of the nature of punitive damages is important,
because it was involved in Michigan's adoption of its Liberal Rule.
Lucas v. Mich. Cent. R.R. Co., 56 N.W. 1039 (Mich. 1893), is frequently cited
as supporting a Liberal Rule for corporate punitive damages and sets a broad
scope-of-employment rule for "exemplary" damages. See Briner v. Hyslop, 337
N.W.2d 858, 864 (Iowa 1983); 2 JOHN J. KIRCHER & CHRISTINE M. WISEMAN,
PUNITIVE DAMAGES: LAW AND PRACTICE § 24:07 n.1 (2000); Philip H. Corboy,
Vicarious Liability for Punitive Damages: The Effort to Constitutionalize "Tort
Reform," 2 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 5, 16 n.50 (1991). But Lucas actually relies
on the Supreme Court's Restrictive Rule in Lake Shore for its result, specifically
on the Supreme Court's restatement of standard scope-of-employment respondeat
superiordoctrine for compensatory damages. See Lucas, 56 N.W. at 1040-41 ("In
[Lake Shore] . . . the court expressly recognize [sic] the rule that, if any
wantonness or mischief on the part of the agent acting within the scope of his
employment causes additional injury to the plaintiff in body or mind, the
principal is liable to make compensation for the whole injury suffered, and a
number of cases are cited in support of the doctrine."). Lucas thus sees no need to
disagree with one of the leading Restrictive Rule cases, in light of Michigan's
regime of not-really-punitive damages. Lucas and its progeny are thus weak
support for the Liberal Rule for normal punitive damages.
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i(estritive RUle for
Statute, MFiC,"'

5

Liborl, Ule fo).
1"scher (1982)25

4

Sop
lel'visors or

policymnakers
Montana

2 i5 3
7
RP(,255
?ickman (1951)25

Statute,
supervisors Or2 5 6

policymiakers ,
Oregon

2 58

Statute, MPC',

Srourd (1 9 7 5 )2(30

sllpevisor8 o 2 5 9

policymakers.
1)'ensylvallia

26

Statute, MI'C,'
26 2
l)oliCy tak e1s

Chus (1979)26

3

252. Mo.ANN. S TAT. § 562.056( 1)(3) (West 1999).
253. Id. § 562.056(3)(2).
251. Fischer v. MAJ lIv. Corp., 631 S.W.2d 902, 906 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); see also
Conseco Fil. Servicing Crp. v. N. Am. Mortgage Co., 381 F.3d 811, 825 (8th Cie.
2004) (applying Missouri law). But see Shef v. Antoniak, No. 05-0147-('VWIllS, 2007 WI. 2463210, at *3 (W.D. Mo. Aug. 27, 2007) ("1 believe the Missouri
ourts will fllow the Restatement anld wNould reject vical'ious liability of [the
corporate defenidant] fbripunitive damages.") (not mentioning Fischer or
('onseco); Murphy v. Nw. Mut. Ins. Co., No. 03-086,1CV-W-IIFS, 2005 WL
1,121789, at 7 n.15 (WI). Mo.June 13, 2005) (mentioning Restatement, but not
Fischer
or Coseeo, and conceding "[liimited research").
255. M i.
(1%omANN. § 45-2-311(1)(b) (2005).
256. d. § 15-2-3113)(b).
257. lickman v. Safeway Stores, 227 P.2d 607, 612 -13 (Mont. 1951); see also Jones v.
Shannon, 175 P. 882, 886 (Mont. 1918) (same reasoning). Btt see Shupak v.N.Y.
ILife ins. Co., 780 F. Supp. 1328, 1344 (1). Mont. 1991) ("This Court believes that
tbe Montana Supreme Court would follow the recent trend by adopting the
standards set forth in [Restatement of Tortsi 909.") (not tentioning ickman).
258. Oto,:.
1 sv.
S-irT. § 161.170(t)(c) (2003).
259. Id. § 161.1/0)2)11)).
260. Stroud v. l1enny's Rest., Inc., 532 11.2d 790, 793 94 (Or. 1975) (revetsing earlier
adhlrece to Restrictive Rtle); see also Johannesen v. Salet)) Iosp., 82 P.3d 139,
1,12
(Or.2003).
2611. 18 'A. ('ONs. SiAT. ANNx. § 307a)(3) (West 1998); Commonwealth v.J.F.lI.mta,
Inc., 590 A.2d 1342, 345 (Pa. Super.Ct. 1991); see also Commonvealth v. Mellwain
Sui. Bus Lines, Inc., 423 A.2d1 413, 119 (Pa. Supter. Ct. 1980.)
262. 18 PA. CoNs. STyT. ANN. § 307(t) (West 1998).
263. Chuy v. Ihiladelphia Eagles Football Club, 595 F.2d 1265, 1278 79 (3d Cir.
1979); Arias v.Iecker Transp. No. 3:06-CV-638, 2008 WJ, ,150435, at ::,1
(M.). Pa.
Feb. 14, 2008); Liake Shore & M.R.S. Co. v.Ros'envweig, 6 A. 515, 553 )'a. 1886);
Shiner v. Moriarty, 706 A.2d 1228, 1210 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998); Dean Witter
1eynolds, Inc. v.(enteel, ,499 A.2d 637, 613 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985); 1)ewitsky v.
Pittston Lumber and Mfg. Co., 82 Pa. 1). & C. 4th 18, No. 5169 Civil 2006, 2007
WVI,2259078, at *22 (Pa. C'om. IT Jan. 17, 2007). A statute provides for a
1'stiictive Rule for health (are providers that poses a 5R Ptoblem. See 10 )A.
C(ts. STA,. ANN § 1303.505(c) (Sutpp. 2008) ("Punitive damages shall not be
awarded againtst a health care provider who is Oly vicariously liable fotr the
actions of its agent that caused tihe inijury unless it can be shown by a
preponderance of the evidence that the party knew of and allowed the conduct by
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Liberal Rule for
Punitive Damages
266
Liberal Rule presumed;
only under
Punitive26 damages
7
statute

Table 8: Pennsylvania-SchizophrenicJurisdictions.
E.

Lack of Cross-Fertilization Between Fields

The law of corporate punitive damages has evolved with virtually
no consideration of the law of corporate crime, and the law of corporate crime has evolved with virtually no consideration of corporate punitive damages. It is astonishing that almost none of the cases that I
have surveyed make cross-references between the fields of criminal
liability and the law of punitive damages. There are a few exceptions
amid the hundreds of cases. 268 But the amount of cross-fertilization is
astonishingly small, given the similarity of the issues and existence of
similar splits of authority. For instance, in Westlaw's ALLCASES
its agent that resulted in the award of punitive damages."). Assuming that
corporate health care providers can be punished at all, it is not clear what level
employee must misbehave to show that a corporation "knew of and allowed" the
underlying misbehavior. One case suggests that "senior management" must be
culpable. Gallagher v. Temple Univ. Hosp., No. 2643, 2004 WL 5135898 (Pa.
Com. P1. Sept. 23, 2004) ("When a high-level official of a corporate defendant
takes ... obviously inappropriate action, it is proper-particularly in the absence
of evidence to the contrary-to assume that she did so with at least the tacit
approval of, and possibly even at the direction of, senior management.").
264. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.08.030(2)(b) (West 2000).

265. Id. § 9A.08.030(1)(c).
266. Id. § 9.73.230(11) (exemplary damages allowed against police agency for illegal
wiretapping); id. § 19.86.090 (treble damages for unfair business practices);
Kadoranian ex rel. Peach v. Bellingham Police Dep't., 829 P.2d 1061 (Wash. 1992)
(interpreting § 9.73.230(11) without suggesting any rogue-police-officer defense);
Edmonds v. John L. Scott Real Estate, Inc., 942 P.2d 1072 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997)
(interpreting § 19.86.090 without suggesting food-chain limit).
267. Spokane Truck & Dray Co. v. Hoefer, 25 P. 1072, 1074-75 (Wash. 1891).
268. See State v. Adjustment Dep't Credit Bureau, Inc., 483 P.2d 687, 690 (Idaho
1971) ("The reasoning in Boise Dodge, Inc. v. Clark, which involved an issue of
punitive damages, is applicable in this [criminal] case involving extortion." (citation omitted)); State v. Christy Pontiac-GMC, Inc., 354 N.W.2d 17, 19 (Minn.
1984) ("If a corporation can be liable in civil tort for both actual and punitive
damages for libel, assault and battery, or fraud, it would seem it may also be
criminally liable for conduct requiring specific intent."); United States v. New
York Herald Co., 159 F. 296, 297 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1907) ("To fasten this species of
knowledge [criminal mens rea] upon a corporation requires no other or different
kind of legal inference than has long been used to justify punitive damages in
cases of tort against an incorporated defendant."); State v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co.,
15 W. Va. 362, 1879 WL 2989 (W. Va. 1879) ("[Iun view of the further fact that
[corporations] may... be subjected to exemplary or punitive damages, I hesitate
to accede to the settlement that they cannot be held liable to an indictment for
any offenses which derive their criminality from evil intention.").
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database, 121 cases include both "Restatement" and "217C"-the section for the Restatement of Agency's Restrictive Rule-and 25 cases
include both "Model Penal Code" and "2.07"-the section for the
MPC's Restrictive Rule. But these two sets of cases do not overlap. 26 9
I am aware of no case in the twenty-eight schizophrenic jurisdictions
even mentioning the conflict I highlight here.
The paradigm instances of the rules in one field do not discuss the
other field. New York Central & Hudson, which established the federal Liberal Rule for corporate crime in 1909, mentioned Lake Shore
from 1893, but only for the proposition that "[i]t is now well established that, in actions for tort, the corporation may be held responsible
for damages for the acts of its agent within the scope of his employment."270 New York Central & Hudson did not mention Lake Shore's
holding on corporate punitive damages, or its Restrictive Rule for
them. Goddardin 1869 established a Liberal Rule for corporate punitive damages without mentioning a case from just the year before
holding that Maine did not allow corporate crime at all where malice
was an element.271 Kolstad, which adopted a Restrictive Rule for Title VII corporate punitive damages, did not mention the federal Liberal Rule for corporate crime. 2 72 The commentary to the MPC appeals
to the Restatement for support, but without noting or explaining why
it uses "high managerial agent" as its touchstone, rather than the Restatements' "managerial agent."2 73 The Restatement (Second) of
Agency briefly mentions corporate criminal punishment in § 217D, but
not the MPC (under preparation by the American Law Institute when
it adopted that Restatement in 1958) or the division of opinion on the
subject. The Restatements of Torts and Restatement (Third) of Agency
do not mention corporate crime at all.
The scholarship on the corporate punitive damages food-chain issue, which has greatly increased since Kolstad addressed it in
1999,274 barely mentions the same issue in corporate crime. 2 75 Like269. Two cases do mention both MODEL PENAL CODE section 2.07 (1962) and a neighboring section of the Restatement, Restatement (Second) of Agency section 217D
(1958). However, none mention both section 2.07 of the Model Penal Code and
section 217C of the Restatement.
270. N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 493 (1909).
271. See Cumberland & Oxford Canal Corp. v. City of Portland, 56 Me. 77, 78, 1868
WL 1758, at *2 (Me. 1868); cf. Androscoggin Water Power Co. v. Bethel Steam
Mill Co., 64 Me. 441, 444, 1875 WL 3949 (Me. 1875) (following Cumberland &
Oxford on this point but without mentioning Goddard).
272. See Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526 (1999).
273. MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 2.07, cmt. at 340 n.15 (1985) (quoting
Restatement).
274. Among the articles discussing corporate punitive damages under Kolstad at
length, but not mentioning corporate crime, see Ann M. Anderson, Note, Whose
Malice Counts?: Kolstad and the Limits of Vicarious Liability for Title VII Punitive Damages, 78 N.C. L. REV. 799 (2000); Amy L. Blaisdell, Note, A New Stan-
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wise, a vast literature on corporate crime, especially the American
Criminal Law Review's annual surveys, 27 6 discusses the food-chain isdard Of Employer Liability Emerges: Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n
Addresses Vicarious Liability in Punitive Damages, 44 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1561
(2000); Andrea Bough, Comment, Punitive Damages in Title VII Employment
Discrimination Cases: Redefining the "Standard",69 UMKC L. REV. 381 (2000);
Raymond L. Bronner, Note, Supreme Court Restricts Employer Vicarious Liability for Punitive Damages under Title VII, 23 Am. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 365 (1999);
Andrea Meryl Kirschenbaum, Comment, Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n: The
Opportunityfor PunitiveDamages in Employment DiscriminationCases, 3 U. PA.
J. LAB. & EMP. L. 617 (2001); David D. Powell, Jr., & Catherine C. Crane, Complying with the Mandate of Kolstad: Are Your Good Faith Efforts Enough?, 36
TULSA L.J. 591 (2001); Tamara Schiffner, Note, Employment Law: The Employer
Escape Chute from Punitive Liability under Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n, 54
OKLA.L. REV. 181 (2001); Rhonda M. Taylor, In Search of the Appropriate Standard for Awarding Punitive Damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1981a-Kolstad v.
American Dental Ass'n, 30 U. MEM. L. REV. 763 (2000).
275. Among articles discussing corporate punitive damages at length, but not mentioning the food-chain issue in corporate crime, see J. Kenneth Barbe, Comment,
Recovering Punitive Damages from Employers: The PracticalApplication of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 909, 18 LAND & WATER L. REV. 671 (1983); Linda
K. Hollander, Trend, Tort Law-New Mexico Holds CorporationsLiable For Punitive Damages Based upon the Actions of ManagerialAgents: Albuquerque Concrete Coring Co. v. Pan Am World Services, Inc., 26 N.M. L. REV. 617 (1996);
Judith J. Johnson, A Uniform Standard for Exemplary Damages in Employment
DiscriminationCases, 33 U. RICH. L. REV. 41, 61-65 (1999) (discussing criminal
mens rea, but not food-chain issue in corporate crime); Clarence Morris, Punitive
Damages in Personal Injury Cases, 21 OHIO STATE L.J. 216 (1960); Parlee, supra
note 4, at 29 (citing Henry W. Edgerton, Corporate Criminal Responsibility, 36
Yale L.J. 827 (1927), only for the proposition that "revenge ...is a questionable
objective of any civilized legal system"); id. at 31-32 n.27, 36-37 n.49 (comprehensively surveying states on corporate punitive damages); id. at 39 n.59 (noting
an analogy between the Restatement's Restrictive Rule and the criminal law of
conspiracy and aiding-and-abetting liability, but without mentioning the law of
corporate crime); id. at 48 n.100 (citing State v. Dried Milk Prods. Coop., 114
N.W.2d 412 (Wis. 1962), a criminal case, without noting the incongruity); id. at
49 n.102 (same); Steven H. Resnicoff, Is it Morally Wrong to Depend on the Honesty of Your Partneror Spouse? Bankruptcy Dischargeabilityof VicariousDebt, 42
CASE W. REs. L. REV. 147, 201 n.181 (1992); Gregory J. Sexto, Note, Corporate
Insurability of Punitive Damages Arising from Employee Acts, 11 J. CORP. L. 99
(1985); Deborah Travis, Comment, Broker Churning: Who is Punished? Vicariously Assessed Punitive Damages in the Context of Brokerage Houses and Their
Agents, 30 Hous. L. REV. 1775, 1797 n.l8 (1993) (describing punitive damages
as akin to criminal liability, but without mentioning food-chain issue in corporate
crime); Timothy R. Zinnecker, Comment, Corporate Vicarious Liability for Punitive Damages, 1985 BYU L. REV. 317 (1985).
276. All of these surveys discuss the federal Liberal Rule and MPC Restrictive Rule at
length, but with no mention of punitive damages. See Sean Bajkowski &
Kimberly R. Thompson, CorporateCriminal Liability, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 445
(1997); Matthew E. Beck & Matthew E. O'Brien, CorporateCriminal Liability, 37
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 261 (2000); Tania Brief & Terrell McSweeny, Corporate Criminal Liability, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 337 (2003); Cynthia E. Carassco & Michael K.
Dupee, Corporate Criminal Liability, 36 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 445 (1999); Ann
Crady, Corporate Criminal Liability, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1053 (1996); Kendel
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sue in criminal law in depth, while barely mentioning corporate puni2 77
tive damages.
Drew & Kyle A. Clark, Corporate Criminal Liability, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 277
(2005); Spencer R. Fisher, Corporate CriminalLiability, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 367
(2004); Annie Geraghty, Corporate Criminal Liability, 39 Am. CRIM. L. REV. 327
(2002); Joseph S. Hall, Corporate Criminal Liability, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 549
(1998); Han Hyewon & Nelson Wagner, Corporate Criminal Liability, 44 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 337 (2007); Melissa Ku & Lee Pepper, Corporate Criminal Liability, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 275 (2008); Jonathan C. Poling & Kimberly Murphy
White, Corporate Criminal Liability, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 525 (2001); Michael
Viano & Jenny R. Arnold, Corporate CriminalLiability, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 311
(2006).
277. Among articles discussing federal and MPC approaches to corporate crime at
length, but not the corresponding split of authority in corporate punitive damages, see Patricia S. April & Ann Morales Olazabal, The Locus of CorporateScienter, 2006 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 81; Elizabeth K. Ainslie, Indicting Corporations
Revisited: Lessons of the Arthur Andersen Prosecution,43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 107
(2006); id. at 133 (quoting State v. Christy Pontiac-GMC, Inc., as quoted supra at
note 268, without any development); John S. Baker, Jr. ProsecutingDioceses and
Bishops, 44 B.C. L. REV. 1061 (2003); Sara Sun Beale & Adam G. Safwat, What
Developments in Western Europe Tell Us About American Critiques of Corporate
CriminalLiability, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV 89 (2004); Kathleen F. Brickey, Rethinking CorporateLiability under the Model Penal Code, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 593 (1988);
id. at 611 n.97 (mentioning that the MPC commentary relies on the Restatement,
but not the Liberal Rule for corporate punitive damages); H. Lowell Brown, Vicarious Criminal Liability of Corporations for the Acts of Their Employees and
Agents, 41 Loy. L. REV. 279 (1995); id. at 297 (mentioning punitive damages only
in a quotation from United States v. New York Herald, 159 F. 296 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1907), as quoted supra note 268); Pamela H. Bucy, CorporateEthos: A Standard
for Imposing Corporate Criminal Liability, 75 MiNN. L. REV. 1095 (1991); id. at
1115 n.75 (mentioning a symposium on punitive damages only in a brief footnote,
and without noting food-chain issues with them); Pamela H. Bucy, Organizational Sentencing Guidelines: The Cart Before the Horse, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 329
(1993); John C. Coffee, Jr., Does "Unlawful" Mean "Criminal"?:Reflections on the
DisappearingTort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193
(1991) (mentioning punitive damages in general, but not food-chain issue regarding them); Peter T. Edelman, Corporate Criminal Liability for Homicide: The
Need To Punish Both the Corporate Entity and its Officers, 92 DICK. L. REV. 193
(1987); Ann Foerschler, CorporateCriminal Intent: Toward a Better Understanding of Corporate Misconduct, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1287 (1990); Steven Friedlander,
Using PriorCorporate Convictions to Impeach, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1313 (1990); Gilbert Geis & Joseph F.C. Dimento, EmpiricalEvidence and the Legal Doctrine of
Corporate Criminal Liability, 29 AM. J. CrmM. L. 341 (2002); Roland Hefendehl,
Corporate Criminal Liability: Model Penal Code Section 2.07 and the Development in Western Legal Systems, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 283 (2000); Kevin B. Huff,
The Role of Corporate Compliance Programsin Determining Corporate Criminal
Liability: A Suggested Approach, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1252 (1996); id. at 1284
n.151 (noting that "punitive damages are similar in purpose and effect to criminal penalties" in discussing the proposal in Harvey L. Pitt & Karl A. Groskaufmanis, Minimizing CorporateCivil and CriminalLiability:A Second Look at
CorporateCodes of Conduct, 78 GEO. L.J. 1559 (1990), but without developing the
analogy any further or mentioning food-chain issues); Henry A. LaBrun, Note,

Innocence by Association: Entities and the Person-EnterpriseRule Under RICO,
63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 179 (1988); William S. Laufer, Corporate Bodies and
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When writers in one of these fields do mention the other field, they
sometimes leave misleading impressions about it. For instance, in the
field of corporate punitive damages, one writer suggests that the law
of corporate crime generally repudiates vicarious liability, 2 78 while
Guilty Minds, 43 EMORY L.J. 647 (1994); William S. Laufer & Alan Strudler, CorporateIntentionality, Desert,and Variants of VicariousLiability, 37 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 1285 (2000); id. at 1297 n.64 (mentioning punitive damages only in quoting
David Luban, A Flawed Case Against Punitive Damages, 87 GEO. L.J. 359, 373
(1998) ("[W]hy should a corporation be chargeable with a crime committed by a
rogue manager? Admittedly, these are hard questions, but in some cases (not all)
I think that the corporation clearly deserves the blame for creating a climate that
encourages rogue behavior."), and without mentioning food-chain issues in corporate punitive damages); William S. Laufer, Integrity, Diligence, and the Limits of
Good CorporateCitizenship,34 A. Bus. L.J. 157 (1996); Wayne A. Logan, Criminal Law Sanctuaries, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 321, 360-61 (2003); Michael B.
Metzger & Dan R. Dalton, Seeing the Elephant:An OrganizationalPerspective on
CorporateMoral Agency, 33 AM. Bus. L.J. 489 (1996); id. at 507 n.118 (briefly
mentioning that the argument on depriving shareholders of ill-gotten gains also
arises in punitive damages, but not mentioning food-chain issues); Alan C.
Michaels, Fastow and ArthurAndersen: Some Reflections on Corporate Criminality, Victim Status, and Retribution, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 551, 554 n.ll (2004);
Samuel R. Miller & Daniel E. Kritz, New Developments in Corporate Criminal
Liability: The Benefits and Risks of Compliance Programs, C800 ALI-ABA 267
(1992); Jennifer Moore, Corporate Culpability Under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 34 ARIZ. L. REV. 743 (1992); Otto G. Obermaier, Vicarious Liability of
Corporations,and Corporate Officers, in 140 PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, CRIMINAL LAW AND URBAN PROBLEMS COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 47 (1985) reprinted in
1 NEW DEVELOPMENTS AND PERSPECTIVES ON CORPORATE CRIME LAW ENFORCE-

MENT IN AMERICA 51 (Leonard Orland and Harold R. Tyler, Jr. eds., 1987); Patrick J. Schott, CorporateCriminalLiability for Work-Site Deaths: Old Law Used
a New Way, 71 MARQ. L. REV. 793 (1988); John E. Stoner, Corporate Criminal
Liability for Homicide: Can the Criminal Law Control Corporate Behavior?, 38
Sw. L.J. 1275 (1985) (mentioning corporate punitive damages only to defend the
existence of corporate criminal liability, and not mentioning the food-chain issue
regarding them); Stacey Neumann Vu, Note, Corporate Criminal Liability:
Patchwork Verdicts and the Problem of Locating a Guilty Agent, 104 COLUM. L.
REV. 459 (2004); Charles S. Walsh & Alissa Pyrich, Corporate Compliance Programs as a Defense to Criminal Liability: Can a CorporationSave Its Soul?, 47
RUTGERS L. REV. 605 (1995); id. at 645 n.142 (mentioning punitive damages as
possible alternative making criminal liability unnecessary, but not mentioning
the food-chain issue regarding corporate punitive damages); Steven Walt & William S. Laufer, Why Personhood Doesn't Matter: Corporate Criminal Liability
and Sanctions, 18 AM. J. CRIM. L. 263 (1991); Keith Welks, Corporate Criminal
Culpability: An Idea Whose Time Keeps Coming, 16 COLuM. J. ENVTL. L. 293
(1991).
278. See, e.g., Gary T. Schwartz, Deterrence and Punishment in the Common Law of
Punitive Damages: A Comment, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 133, 136 (1982):
Consider now the problem of vicarious liability for punitive damages. As
a general matter, our existing criminal law regards vicarious liability as
an impermissible basis for punishment (except, perhaps, for a limited
range of minor penalty regulatory offenses): one man cannot be judged
morally guilty on account of another man's crime. By contrast, our civil
law of torts warmly embraces vicarious liability, apparently because the
employer is in the best position to control the behavior of his own em-
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another mentions only the federal Liberal Rule. 2 79 In the field of corporate crime, one writer suggests that the Liberal Rule for corporate
punitive damages is uncontroversial, 28 0 while another suggests that
2
the Lake Shore Restrictive Rule is the general rule. 81
A few articles do mention both splits of authority, or both fields,
but without aiming to give a comprehensive assessment of food-chain
issues. 28 2 One pair of commentators has noted the federal-schizoployees. If punishment is the chief purpose of punitive damages, then
the criminal law model should prevail and vicarious liability should be
rejected.
Of course, if anything, criminal law is more receptive to vicarious punitive liability as applied to corporations than the law of punitive damages. See J. DENNIS
HYNES & MARK J. LOEWENSTEIN, AGENCY, PARTNERSHIP, AND THE LLC 240-41
(6th ed. 2003) (setting out the division of authority on vicarious liability for punitive damages, and noting an analogy to vicarious criminal liability, but suggesting that it would only be appropriate for strict-liability offenses, contrary to
the actual approach in the law of corporate crime).
279. Corboy, supra note 251, at 46 & n.203 (comprehensively surveying the law of
punitive damages, but mentioning only the federal Liberal Rule for corporate
crime: "[C]riminal law recognizes vicarious liability for criminal violations by
agents under the doctrine of respondeat superior," citing N.Y Cent. & Hudson
R.R. Co. 212 U.S. 481, 491-93 (1909), but no states following the MPC); cf.
Corboy, supra note 251 at 16 n.50 (comprehensively listing states following Liberal Rule for corporate punitive damages); Corboy, supra note 251, at 25 n.79
(comprehensively listing states following Restrictive Rule for corporate punitive
damages).
280. William S. Laufer, Corporate Liability,Risk Shifting, and the Paradoxof Compliance, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1343, 1346 n.9 (1999) ("The standard of vicarious liability
poses unique challenges to the administration of the criminal law .... Its place
in tort law, though, is rarely challenged."). Laufer cites Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip, 299 U.S. 1, 14 (1991), which merely approved the Liberal
Rule for corporate punitive damages as constitutional. Laufer does not note the
existence of the food-chain controversy concerning corporate punitive damages.
281. Deborah A. DeMott, OrganizationalIncentives to CareAbout the Law, 60 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 39, 51 (Autumn 1997) (seeming to assume that the Restatement-Lake Shore Restrictive Rule is standard for corporate punitive damages: "In
contrast to the broad principle applicable to criminal misconduct, only high level
complicity, or liability stemming from the act of a managerial agent, warrants
vicarious liability for punitive damages."); id. at 44 (noting the tension between
the Liberal Rule for federal criminal law and the Restrictive Rule that applies to
federal corporate punitive damages: "The principle of vicarious liability within
federal criminal law also contrasts with the complicity requirement-comparable
to the Model Penal Code-imposed by federal common law for vicarious liability
for punitive damages in civil litigation."). The RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY

(2006), however, for which DeMott was the reporter, notes the division of authority on corporate punitive damages. See supra notes 37 and 38.
282. See Daniel R. Fischel & Alan 0. Sykes, Corporate Crime, 25 J. LEG. STUD. 319
(1996) (analyzing the proper amount of corporate punishment without setting out
the divisions of authority in any detail); id. at 337 n.32 (briefly noting difference
between federal rule and MPG); id. at 348 ("Our discussion of corporate criminal
liability also has implications for the imposition of punitive civil liability against
corporations."); id. (concluding that to avoid excessive investment in monitoring,
a corporation should only pay, either in punitive damages or in a criminal fine,
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phrenic conflict between the Kolstad Restrictive Rule for corporate punitive damages under Title VII and the federal-criminal-law Liberal
Rule, but without examination of the division of authority in each
2
field. 83
It is particularly striking that the mismatch between corporate punitive damages and corporate crime has gone without extended analysis because many sorts of litigants could raise such issues to their
advantage when the rules are being reconsidered. If I am right in my
arguments below that a mismatch between corporate crime and corporate punitive damages is not justified, then those litigants facing a
less favorable rule in one field should draw an analogy to the other.
Because federal-schizophrenic jurisdictions have a more corporatedefendant-friendly rule for punitive damages than for criminal law,
punitive-damages plaintiffs and criminal-law corporate defendants
should have a strong incentive to point out the schizophrenia to courts
(or, in some cases, legislatures). Plaintiffs seeking punitive damages
in such jurisdictions should suggest that there are no good reasons to
have a more restrictive rule for them than for criminal prosecutors.
Corporate criminal defendants in such jurisdictions can profitably argue that there is no good reason to treat them more harshly in the
context of criminal law than they are treated in the context of punitive
damages. 28 4 In Connecticut, Mississippi, Nevada, New Mexico, the
"the social cost of the agent's wrong inflated by the likelihood that the agent will
escape sanction"); id. (very briefly noting division of authority on corporate punitive damages); V.S. Khanna, Is the Notion of CorporateFault a Faulty Notion?:
The Case of Corporate Mens Rea, 79 B.U. L. REV. 355 (1999) (discussing the
proper approach to corporate crime, briefly mentioning the MPC without setting
out the food-chain issues in detail, and not mentioning the food-chain issue in
corporate punitive damages); id. at 370 n.83 (noting the MPC approach but noting that "[t]hese other standards are not examined because they would not
change the primary conclusions of this Article"); id. at 382 n.152 (mentioning
"analogous reasoning in the context of punitive damages"); id. at 391 (noting that
.a similar argument can and has been made in the context of punitive damages");
Philip A. Lacovara & David P. Nicoli, Vicarious Criminal Liability of Organizations: RICO as an Example of a Flawed Principle in Practice, 64 ST. JOHN'S L.
REV. 725, 731 n.41 (1990) (briefly noting existence of division of authority on foodchain issue in corporate punitive damages in context of discussion of corporate
crime); Harvey L. Pitt & Karl A. Groskaufmanis, Minimizing CorporateCivil and
Criminal Liability: A Second Look at Corporate Codes of Conduct, 78 GEO. L.J.
1559, 1566-69 (1990) (discussing corporate punitive damages while mentioning
Goddard, the Restatement, the federal criminal rule, and the MPC, but without
setting out the conflicts of authority).
283. Andrew Weissman & David Newman, Rethinking Criminal CorporateLiability,
82 IND. L.J. 411, 437-39 (2007) (relying on Kolstad for support for a due-diligence
defense to corporate crime, but without mentioning division of authority regarding corporate punitive damages); Weissmann, supra note 73, at 1332-34 (same).
284. For one such suggestion on behalf of corporate criminal defendants under federal
law, pointing out the existence of a food-chain defense to punitive damages under
-Title VII, see Weissman & Newman, supra note 283. The Title VII plaintiffs in
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Virgin Islands, and Wyoming, where I use my presumption of a Liberal Rule, corporate criminal defendants can argue that my presumption in favor of a simpler rule should be replaced by a Restrictive Rule
like that governing punitive damages in the jurisdiction.
Pennsylvania-schizophrenic states, however, have more corporatedefendant-friendly rules for criminal law than they do for punitive
damages. Prosecutors facing heightened standards can suggest that
they should be relaxed to match the rules governing punitive damages. On the other hand, corporate defendants seeking to defend
against punitive awards should suggest that the standards from criminal law be imported into punitive damages. In Washington, where I
apply my Liberal-Rule presumption, corporate civil defendants can
use the state's MPC-style statute limiting corporate criminal liability
to argue in favor of a similar limit on corporate punitive damages.
While courts and legislatures in either Federal-Schizophrenia or
Pennsylvania-Schizophrenia states should attend to this conflict in
their approaches to punishing corporations, Consistently Restrictive
states can also learn from a comparison of the fields, chiefly by attending to the variety of different Restrictive Rules that are available.
Courts interpreting relatively undeveloped or unclear Restrictive
Rules have a rich source of analyses if they consider both the rules
applying to corporate punitive damages and those governing corporate
crime. In particular, eight states have unclear Restrictive Rules for
corporate punitive damages (Colorado, Idaho, Iowa, Kentucky, North
Dakota, Ohio, Texas, and West Virginia) but relatively clear Restrictive Rules for corporate crime. None of the sixteen Consistently Restrictive jurisdictions make any explicit link between their two
Restrictive Rules for corporate punishment, and only two (Guam and
Minnesota) adopt the same rule; three (Illinois, New Jersey, and New
2
York) adopt different rules in the two fields. 85
The arguments below against Federal or Pennsylvania Schizophrenia also counsel against adopting differing sorts of Restrictive Rules
for corporate crime and for corporate punitive damages. There does
not, therefore, seem to be any justification for the MPC adopting a
"high managerial" standard in distinction to the Restatements' "managerial" standard. Such a higher standard for corporate crime than
for corporate punitive damages would be Pennsylvania Schizophrenia
writ small. Likewise, a higher standard for corporate punitive damages than for corporate crime, as in New Jersey and Illinois, is Federal
Schizophrenia writ small. As in fully Federal-Schizophrenic jurisdictions, corporate criminal defendants and plaintiffs seeking punitive
Kolstad might have profitably pointed out the discrepancy as an argument in
favor of the Liberal Rule, however, by citing New York Central & Hudson and its
progeny.
285. See supra Table 5.
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damages would do well to highlight this mismatch to courts and
legislatures.
Finally, a comparison between fields can help courts in Consistently Liberal jurisdictions where I apply my Liberal-Rule presumption
for one field or the other. Prosecutors in Alabama, Maryland,
Oklahoma, and South Carolina can use their states' Liberal Rules for
corporate punitive damages to argue for following the federal rule,
while civil plaintiffs in Nebraska can use their state's Liberal Rule for
criminal law to argue for a similar rule to govern punitive damages
(though in Nebraska, such damages must go to the schools286).
IV. WHY CRIMINAL LAW AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES SHOULD
HAVE THE SAME FOOD-CHAIN RULE FOR
PUNISHING CORPORATIONS
When we take the effort to lay the two food-chain divisions of authority side by side, we notice that several jurisdictions use very different rules for criminal law and for the law of punitive damages. Is
there any justification for using different rules for the two different
regimes? I will offer five reasons to think that these different rules
are, in fact, pathological.
A.

Identical Functions: Deterrence and Retribution

Courts describing the purposes of punitive damages have explained repeatedly that their function is deterrence and retribution,
not remediation or compensation. Their very name suggests that they
are designed, like the criminal law, to be punitive. 28 7 Both areas of
law allow society to blame communally the most culpable and most
reprehensible conduct in its midst. For instance, in 2001's Cooper Industries, the Supreme Court considered the standard of review for
BMW constitutional challenges to the size of punitive damages. 28 8
They decided to use a de novo standard in part because excessive-fine
challenges to proportionality are reviewed de novo, and punitive dam28 9
ages serve the same purposes as criminal law.
286. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
287. Michigan and New Hampshire are the only two states with a contrary view. See
supra notes 251 (Michigan) and 117 and 118 (New Hampshire).
288. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424 (2001).
289. Id. at 432. See also, e.g., Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-1-65(1)(e) (West 1999) ("The trier
of fact shall be instructed that the primary purpose of punitive damages is to
punish the wrongdoer and deter similar misconduct in the future."); Philip Morris USAv. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057, 1066 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("There
is little difference between the justification for a criminal sanction, such as a fine
or a term of imprisonment, and an award of punitive damages ....
[A] punitive
damages award, instead of serving a compensatory purpose, serves the entirely
different purposes of retribution and deterrence that underlie every criminal
sanction."); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 (2003);
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It is true that criminal law in general also seeks to incapacitate
and rehabilitate. But these are not particularly prominent goals for
criminal law as such, at least as applied to corporations. If we merely
want to incapacitateor restrain corporations, or change how they operate without exacting retribution, we generally use administrative
regulations rather than the criminal law pertaining to the most seri2 90
ous crimes.
B.

Applicability of Reasons to Both Fields

The debates between Restrictive and Liberal Rules feature four arguments most prominently-one argument each rooted in either retribution or deterrence and favoring either a Restrictive or a Liberal
Rule. Because all of these arguments apply equally well in either the
context of punitive damages or criminal law, I conclude that the two
debates should be resolved similarly.
The retribution-based argument for a Restrictive Rule is that vicarious punitive liability, as such, is unjust. Prosser and Keeton explain
that courts supporting a Restrictive Rule, like Lake Shore, "lay[]
stress on the injustice of a punishment inflicted upon one who has
been entirely innocent throughout."29 1 This objection, if it is a good
Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 58 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Juarez v.
Menard, Inc., 366 F.3d 479 (7th Cir. 2004); Haralson v. Fisher Surveying, Inc., 31
P.3d 114, 121 (Ariz. 2001) (McGregor, J., dissenting in part); Franz v. Calaco Dev.
Corp., 818 N.E.2d 357, 370 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004); Cheatham v. Pohle, 789 N.E.2d
467, 471 (Ind. 2003); Westray v. Wright, 834 N.E.2d 173, 179 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005);
Lane County v. Wood, 691 P.2d 473, 479 (Or. 1984); Atkinson v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 604 S.E.2d 385, 389 (S.C. 2004); Longshore v. Saber Sec. Servs., Inc.,
619 S.E.2d 5, 11 (S.C. Ct. App. 2005); Kink v. Combs, 135 N.W.2d 789, 798 (Wis.
1965); Wischer v. Mitsubishi Heavy Indus. Am., Inc., 673 N.W.2d 303, 319-20
(Wis. Ct. App. 2003) (Fine, J., concurring).
290. Cf Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 401, 405 (1958) ("[A] 'crime' is . . . not simply antisocial conduct which
public officers are given a responsibility to suppress. It is not simply any conduct
to which a legislature chooses to attach a 'criminal' penalty. It is conduct which,
if duly shown to have taken place, will incur a formal and solemn pronouncement
of the moral condemnation of the community.").
An argument might also be made that, although both criminal law and punitive damages pursue the same two goals, deterrence and retribution, they pursue
a different distribution between them. For instance, we might think that the
function of one field is mainly deterrence, but the function of the other is mainly
retribution. However, if this were the case, we would expect to see more general
differences between criminal mens rea and punitive-damages-level scienter
outside the area of corporations.
291. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 2, at 12 (5th ed. 1984);
see also State v. Casey's Gen. Stores, Inc., 587 N.W.2d 599, 601 (Iowa 1998) ("Vicarious liability occurs when 'one [person] is made liable, though without personal fault, for the bad conduct of someone else.' . . . This doctrine is contrary to
the 'basic premise of criminal justice that crime requires personal fault.'"(quoting
WAYNE LA FAvE & AuSTIN W. SCOTT, JR. CRIMINAL LAw § 3.9, at 250 (2d ed.
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one, undermines the Liberal Rule for either crime or punitive
damages.
Courts defend the retributive propriety of a Liberal Rule, however,
by stressing that corporations act only through agents. It therefore
does not make sense to distinguish between high-level and low-level
employees. Liability is vicarious in either case, so there is no special
problem for low-level employees; if punishment of the servant is
proper because of his mental state and his outward action, then punishment of the corporation is equally proper, because it has performed
the same outward action with the same mental state. The Goddard
and New York Central paradigms of Liberal Rules each make this argument. Goddard stated:
A corporation... has no mind but the mind of its servants; it has no voice but
the voice of its servants; and it has no hands with which to act but the hands
of its servants. All its schemes of mischief, as well as its schemes of public
enterprise, are conceived by human minds and executed by human hands; and
these minds and hands are its servants' minds and hands. All attempts,
therefore, to distinguish between the guilt of the servant and the guilt of the
corporation; or the malice of the servant and the malice of the corporation; or
the punishment of the servant and the punishment of the corporation, is sheer
nonsense ....292

Joel Prentiss Bishop, quoted in New York Central, reasons, "[S]ince a
corporation acts by its officers and agents, their purposes, motives,
and intent are just as much those of the corporation as are the things
done." 29 3 Again, the argument is the same in both fields.
1986))); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.03, cmt. e (2006) ("The approach
outlined in § 909 [of the Restatement of Torts] is preferable because it requires
consideration of circumstances relevant to a principal's culpability."); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 909 cmt. a (1939) ("[Tlhe reasons for awarding punitive damages . . . make it improper ordinarily to award such damages against one who
himself is personally innocent."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 909, cmt. b
(1979).
292. Goddard v. Grand Trunk Ry., 57 Me. 202, 223, 1869 WL 2230, at *15 (1869).
293. 2 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, NEW COMMENTARIES ON THE CRIMINAL LAW UPON A NEW
SYSTEM OF LEGAL ExPOSITION § 417, at 255-56 (8th ed. 1892) (quoted in N.Y.
Cent. & Hudson R.R. Co., 212 U.S. 481, 492-93 (1909)); see also Embrey v. Holly,
442 A.2d 966, 970 (Md. 1982) ("[A]s a corporation can only act through its agents,
logic would dictate that the 'fault' of the agent be imputed to the corporation for
purposes of determining responsibility for a wrongful act.... ."); Pullman PalaceCar Co. v. Lawrence, 22 So. 53, 58 (Miss. 1897) ("Having, by the constitution of
their being, to act solely by agents or servants, [corporations] must, as matter of
sound public policy, be held liable for all the acts of their agents and servants who
commit wrong while performing the master's business, and in the scope of their
employment."); Jones v. Shannon, 175 P. 882, 885 (Mont. 1918) ("A corporation
... is an artificial person, and can only act through agents; and if the malignant
motives of the agent are not imputable to it, it would necessarily follow that it
could not be held liable for the malicious acts of its agents in any case."); State v.
Louisville & N. R.R. Co., 19 S.W. 229, 229 (Tenn. 1892) ("Being a corporation,
[the defendant] necessarily acts only through its agents. If the obstruction is the
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Turning to deterrence, some courts justify a Restrictive Rule by
saying that we cannot deter rogue employees by punishing the
corporation:
It is obvious, however, that there can be no effective deterrence unless there is
some conduct which can be deterred. Thus, if an employer is only vicariously
liable and could have done nothing to prevent the misconduct of its employee,
it seems of little value to award punitive damages against the employer. In
many instances there is probably little that an
employer can do to prevent the
29 4
employee from committing outrageous torts.

This argument applies in both fields too. If this argument were cogent, the failure of the Liberal Rule to account for rogue employees
would undermine its rationale in either field; neither sort of Liberal
Rule would properly deter misbehavior.
Courts favoring a Liberal Rule, however, argue that a Liberal Rule
will properly deter corporate misbehavior by producing a proper incentive to monitor low-level employees. Goddard stated:
Careful engineers can be selected who will not run their trains into open
draws; and careful baggage men can be secured, who will not handle and
smash trunks and band-boxes as is now the universal custom; and conductors
and brakemen can be had who will not assault and insult passengers; and if
the courts will only let the verdicts of upright and intelligent juries alone, and
let the doctrine of exemplary damages have its legitimate influence, we predict these great and growing evils will be very much lessened, if not entirely
cured. There is but one vulnerable point about these ideal existences, called
corporations; and that is, the pocket of the monied power that is concealed
behind them; and if that is reached they will wince. When it is thoroughly
understood that it is not profitable to employ careless and indifferent agents,
or reckless
and insolent servants, better men will take their places, and not
29 5
before.

The Supreme Court added in a later defense of the Liberal Rule for
corporate crime:
The treasury of the business may not with impunity obtain the fruits of violations which are committed knowingly by agents of the entity in the scope of
their employment. Thus pressure is brought2 9on
those who own the entity to
6
see to it that their agents abide by the law.

This argument, too, applies equally well in either field. If it is sensible
to motivate corporate monitoring of low-level employees by making
them feel the sting whenever such employees misbehave, then both
the sting of criminal liability and the sting of punitive damages should
2 97
be effective toward that end.

294.
295.
296.
297.

act of its agents, it is the act of the corporation provided the agent did the act in
the course and scope of his duty as an agent.").
Briner v. Hyslop, 337 N.W.2d 858, 865 (Iowa 1983). For a similar argument, see
Tolle v. Interstate Sys. Truck Lines, Inc., 356 N.E.2d 625, 627 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976).
Goddard v. Grand Trunk Ry., 57 Me. 202, 224, 1869 WL 2230, at *15 (1869).
United States v. A & P Trucking Co., 358 U.S. 121, 126 (1958).
In my work in progress, I evaluate these four arguments and argue that they end
largely in a stalemate.
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Similar Mens Rea and Scienter Requirements

A third reason why corporate crime and corporate punitive damages should follow the same food-chain rule is that they are both, in
essence, just applications of the problem of corporate mens rea or corporate mental states. Restrictive Rules decline to impute "rogue" employees' guilty mental states to the corporations, while Liberal Rules
recognize no such category.
Just as punitive damages and criminal liability share the same
goals of deterrence and retribution, they also share the same requirement of mens rea or scienter. The Supreme Court's 1983 review of
punitive-damages law in Smith v. Wade pointed to "criminal indiffer2 98
ence to civil obligations" as the touchstone for punitive damages.
99
Lake Shore referred to "criminal intent" as the requisite.2
Concerning retribution, it is true that corporations act only through agents.
As a result, the argument against the justice of vicarious punitive liability is
therefore really an argument against any sort of corporate punishment, not an
argument for a Restrictive Rule. However, it might still be possible to impute
some employees' mental states to a corporation, but not others; the only-throughagents principle does not forbid making the sorts of distinctions among such
agents made in a Restrictive Rule, any more than the principle that corporations
act only through human beings forbids making distinctions regarding a corporation's responsibility for various human beings.
Concerning deterrence, it is true that, strictly speaking, punishing one person
cannot deter the misbehavior of someone else. The devotee of deterrence argues
that misbehavior will stop if we make it painful enough, but that will not necessarily work if the pain and misbehavior are located in different people. The argument that a Liberal Rule will encourage monitoring of lower-level employees does
supply an intelligible rationale for the rule. However, such monitoring is costly,
and it is not obvious how much investment in crime prevention we want to require of corporate employers.
After this evaluation, then, the key question is how much investment in
preventing misbehavior by low-level employees we may properly demand of a corporation. On the basis of an analogy with individual character, I answer that we
may properly demand enough such investment to cleanse a corporate culture of
criminogenic tendencies. Accordingly I favor a view like that discussed above in
section II.B.4: if an employee's misbehavior fits with corporate culture as embodied in explicit and implicit policies, then corporate punishment is proper.
298. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 41 (1983) (quoting Phila., Wilmington. & Balt. R.R.
Co. v. Quigley, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 202, 214 (1858)). In dissent, then-Justice Rehnquist argued that the criminal-law standard should require intent, rather than
mere recklessness, but agreed that punitive damages and criminal law follow the
same standard for improper mental state. Smith, 461 U.S. at 87 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) ("19th century decisions consistently justified the imposition of a
quasi-criminal 'fine' by reference to the 'wickedness' or 'evil' conduct of the defendant, just as Oliver Wendall Holmes drew a sharp distinction between accidentally and intentionally kicking an animal.").
299. Lake Shore & Mich. S. Ry. Co. v. Prentice, 147 U.S. 101, 111 (1893) ("[A] corporation, like a natural person, may be held liable in exemplary or punitive damages
for the act of an agent within the scope of his employment, provided the criminal
intent, necessary to warrant the imposition of such damages, is brought home to
the corporation.") (emphasis added); see also Cheatham v. Pohle, 789 N.E.2d 467,
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The food-chain issue is just the problem of corporate mental states.
If a low-level employee misbehaves, a high-level employee need only
add an improper mental state-a ratifying "well done, good and faithful servant"-to make the action warrant corporate punishment. No
additional outward actions from high-level employees are required. It
is common ground among all of the Restrictive Rules that a low-level
employee's outward action, coupled with a sufficiently-high-level employee's approval, will be enough to warrant corporate punishment.
The issue dividing the Restrictive Rule from the Liberal Rule is simply
how demanding we want to be regarding corporate mens rea or scienter. If, then, criminal law and the law of punitive damages use the
same mens rea and scienter standards as a general matter, they
should also use the same such standards when they consider
corporations.
D.

Clarity in the Corporate Duty to Prevent Employee
Misbehavior

A fourth reason why corporations should face the same food-chain
rules in corporate crime and corporate punitive damages is that the
rules specify the same duty on the part of the corporation: the duty to
monitor and prevent low-level employees' misbehavior. Liberal Rules
take the view that a corporation, just in virtue of being a corporation,
has the legal duty, enforced by punitive sanctions, to prevent all criminal misbehavior or reprehensible conduct by any employee. Restrictive Rules instead take the view that a corporation has only the duty
to prevent criminal behavior or reprehensible conduct by sufficiently
important employees. It makes no sense for the same sovereign to enforce with punitive sanctions two differently-sized duties on corporations regarding the prevention of exactly the same misbehavior by
low-level employees.
E.

Punishing Corporations and Blaming Corporations

A final reason to think that both criminal law and the law of punitive damages should follow the same rule on the food-chain issue is
that our communal acts of blaming and assessing responsibility are
simply large-scale versions of our individual acts of blaming and assessing responsibility. Those practices of blaming encompass both in471 (Ind. 2003) ("[Punitive damages may be awarded upon a showing of a 'quasicriminal' state of mind or willful and wanton misconduct." (quoting Cacdac v.
West, 705 N.E.2d 506, 510 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999))). Courts have drawn the similarity of evil-motive requirement from the similarity of punitive functions in the two
fields. See, e.g., Carter v. Aramark Sports & Entm't Servs., Inc., 835 A.2d 262,
286 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2001).
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dividual human beings and corporations.30 0 In our ordinary,
everyday lives, we have to decide whether to blame corporations for
things, and we have to resolve food-chain issues to do so.
Consider two examples of individual reactive attitudes toward corporations involving food-chain questions, but unrelated to the law.
Suppose a bank employee is rude to me. Do I regard that misbehavior as the misbehavior of the bank itself, or just the employee? It
will depend on all the same considerations that courts use to decide
food-chain issues: Did the bank apologize to me for the employee's
rudeness? Was the person who was rude the branch president, or just
a teller who was fired as a result? Are people at that bank typically
rude in a whole range of cases, or was this incident aberrational?
As a second example, I have for the last few years generally not
shopped at a certain grocery store chain, because I was very unhappy
with the corporation's actions during the rezoning of land across the
street from my house. I think that a corporation that treats neighbors
of proposed stores the way that this corporation treated me is not deserving of my good will and my business. Now, in being unhappy with
the corporation for its treatment of me, I am attributing the mental
states of particular employees of the corporation to the corporation itself. But I might reason that these particular employees were too far
down the chain of command to blame the entire corporation for their
misdeeds. It might not make sense, for instance, to avoid the corporation's stores in Mississippi just because of something that happened in
Indiana.
Both criminal law and the law of punitive damages frequently recur to the criteria ordinary people use in deciding whether to blame a
criminal or civil defendant.301 My thesis is simply that both criminal
law and punitive damages should, in deciding food-chain issues, use
the same factors and rules that ordinary people use in deciding
whether to blame a corporation. Both criminal law and the law of punitive damages should, therefore, recognize a food-chain defense to
corporate punishment whenever our ordinary attitudes of placing
blame on corporations would recognize such a defense.
The function of both corporate criminal liability and corporate punitive damages is to express blame on the structures responsible for
300. See, e.g., 2 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, ENTERPRISE LIABILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY
C, 9, 11 (1991); Samuel W. Buell, The Blaming Function of Entity Criminal Liability, 81 IND. L.J. 473, 491-92 (2006); PETER CANE, RESPONSIBILITY IN LAW AND
MORALITY 41 (2002).
301. See, e.g., Hart, supra note 290, at 405 (stating that a crime is 'conduct which, if
duly shown to have taken place, will incur a formal and solemn pronouncement of
the moral condemnation of the community"); Franz v. Calaco Dev. Corp., 818
N.E.2d 357, 371 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (explaining that the role of the jury in the
assessment of punitive damages is "to articulate community values in evaluating
the reprehensibility of a defendant's conduct").
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anti-social conduct and thereby to prevent it. Because the food-chain
issue is rooted in pre-legal issues of corporate blame and responsibility, rather than anything distinctive about the criminal process or the
process of imposing punitive damages, we would expect both areas to
converge on the same body of law. Because the two areas of law are
approaching the same problem, they should be mutually informative,
and a lack of uniformity between the two areas should be seen as a
symptom that one or the other approach, or both, is ill-considered.
F.

Possible Defenses of a Mismatch

As noted above, no one has set out the mismatch between criminal
law and punitive damages, let alone defended it, and I think there are
compelling reasons why corporate punitive damages and corporate
crime should follow the same rule. What might be said, however, on
the other side of the issue? Are there any good reasons to justify either Federal or Pennsylvania Schizophrenia-that is, to explain why
it is not really schizophrenic, but just good sense? I can think of five
possible ways one might attempt to argue that either Federal or Pennsylvania Schizophrenia is not really schizophrenic, but they do not
seem compelling.
One defense of either Federal or Pennsylvania Schizophrenia is
that the Liberal Rules for corporate punishment might be offsetting.
We only need so much punishment of corporations for the misdeeds of
minor employees, the argument would go. To the extent that we allow
broad criminal punishment of corporations, there is less need for corporate punitive damages, and vice versa. If we only need to have one
30 2
sort of Liberal Rule, having two is overkill.
If, however, punitive damages and criminal liability are unfairly
duplicative in the case of punishment for minor-employee misbehavior, they would be similarly duplicative in the case of any sort of corporate punishment. If it is overkill to have two Liberal Rules, it would
be just as much overkill in general to have two ways of punishing corporations-or indeed, two ways of punishing individuals. However,
every jurisdiction (with the possible exceptions of Michigan and New
Hampshire's idiosyncratic forms of punitive damages) allows both
302. This sort of argument is similar to one once adopted by Indiana, which held that
punitive damages on top of criminal liability was akin to double jeopardy. See
Eddy v. McGinnis, 523 N.E.2d 737 (Ind. 1988) (reviewing history of the rule and
concluding that the legislature could change it). At least one state uses the existence of other penalties as a mitigating reason not to impose large punitive damages. Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-1-65(1)(f)(ii)(4) (West 1999). However, BMW of N.
Am., Inc. v. Gore and its progeny hold that the existence of a heavy criminal penalty for particular conduct is a reason in favor of relatively large punitive damages, not a reason to avoid them. See BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 583
(1996); Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057, 1061 (2007); State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 428 (2003).
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forms of corporate punishment. Using an argument against multiple
punishments to justify getting rid of one Liberal Rule while simultaneously allowing multiple punishments of a corporation in the case of
high-level misbehavior, and allowing multiple punishments of misbehaving individuals, does not seem sensible.
The remaining arguments I consider here offer possible reasons
why either Federal or Pennsylvania Schizophrenia might make sense.
However, we cannot explain both of them by pointing to systematic
bias in favor of one or the other. Because Federal and Pennsylvania
Schizophrenia are both common, the best explanation for them is
probably simple failure to consider the other field, or failure to consider it in enough detail. Legislatures adopting criminal codes to apply to corporations do not pay attention to the state of the law
regarding corporate punitive damages, and courts considering the
punishment of corporations with punitive damages do not consider
that an identical problem confronts criminal law. The randomness of
the patterns of legal schizophrenia suggests that simple inattention is
the most likely explanation.
One defense of Pennsylvania Schizophrenia would point to the fact
that, in certain ways, criminal liability is more serious than liability
for punitive damages. The criminal law has a wider variety of sanctions at its disposal than do civil courts. Of the corporation's three
chief interests-liberty, property, and reputation-punitive damages
strike only at one, corporate property. A corporate criminal conviction, however, may lead to restrictions on its liberty through probation
conditions, 30 3 or to public shaming. 30 4 Because these criminal sanctions are higher, the argument would go, we should have stricter standards for corporate crime than for corporate punitive damages. So
Pennsylvania Schizophrenia makes sense.
If, though, the higher sanctions in criminal law justify a stricter
food-chain rule there, then they would also justify a stricter approach
to mens rea than we take to punitive-damages-worthy scienter. If the
fact that criminal liability is more serious than punitive damages is
sufficient to require heightened mental state requirements for corporations, that fact would justify heightened mental state requirements
for individuals. Indeed, because individuals can be sent to prison, the
argument would be far stronger in the case of individuals. But as explained above, states take the same approach to improper mental
states in both fields.
303. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8D1.3(c) (2007).

304. See, e.g., id. § 8D1.4(a). However, shaming may not be unique to criminal law;
"there is a stigma attached to an award of punitive damages that does not accompany a purely compensatory award." Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1,
54 (1991) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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On the other hand, one defense of Federal Schizophrenia would
highlight the lower procedural standards for punitive damages. Punitive damages are assessed on the basis of a lower standard of proof;
either proof by a preponderance of evidence or by clear and convincing
evidence, rather than proof beyond reasonable doubt. Punitive damages lack a requirement that particular conduct be forbidden in advance, as under criminal law. Punitive damages may be available to
many different plaintiffs, making one-stop shopping more difficult
than in the criminal law, where a single prosecutor will be in charge
(per jurisdiction, at least). In sum, as the Supreme Court has explained, "[a]lthough these awards serve the same purposes as criminal
penalties, defendants subjected to punitive damages in civil cases
have not been accorded the protections applicable in a criminal proceeding." 3 05 If the law is justifiably more concerned about excessive
punishment of corporations in such a setting, one remedy might be to
adopt a Restrictive Rule for corporate punitive damages. But the
heightened procedural safeguards in criminal law might make us
think that we can have looser rules for corporate crime.
As with the explanation for Pennsylvania Schizophrenia above,
however, there is no reason to show special solicitude for corporations
regarding the fact that punitive damages are in certain ways easier to
obtain than criminal convictions. If these procedural differences warrant a higher standard for punitive damages, then we would expect to
see a generally higher requirement for punitive-damages-worthy scienter than we do for criminal mens rea. However, we do not.
Another structural difference between punitive damages and criminal law, also conceivably favoring Federal Schizophrenia, is the fact
that the criminal law is not fully enforced. 306 Prosecutors may decide
not to go after a particular corporation, for instance, if they decide that
corporate criminal liability is not in the public interest. Civil plaintiffs who are harmed by corporations' misdeeds, however, will presumably not be willing to forego the chance to recover punitive damages
simply because they think that punishing a particular corporation is
not the right thing to do. This structural difference can be overstated,
however. Most states do not allow punitive damages simply as a matter of right. Punitive damages are generally discretionary, so particular fact-finders can decide not to punish particular corporate
wrongdoers. A measure of such discretion, however, also exists with
respect to criminal law, where the sentencing judge may decide that a
large fine on a corporation, or heavy probation restrictions, are not in
the public interest. Criminal law, then, has two opportunities for
mercy-the government may decline to prosecute, and the sentencing
305. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 538 U.S. at 417.
306. See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, The PathologicalPolitics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH.
L. REV. 505, 507 (2001).
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judge may decline to punish-while punitive damages has only one
discretionary opportunity for mercy. 30 7 Given the existence of elected
prosecutors who can short-circuit the full enforcement of the criminal
law, there may be a structural reason to make criminal liability
broader than liability for punitive damages. Further, the federal
prosecutorial guidelines may act, if enforced fully, as a de facto Restrictive Rule for federal corporate crime (though they would not explain the other seventeen jurisdictions afflicted with Federal
Schizophrenia, but without such prosecutorial policies).
However, the tendency of criminal law to expand far beyond the
actual conduct worthy of punishment, while relying on prosecutorial
discretion to pick out the offenders who really deserve prosecution, is
rightly called a pathology. 30 8 If our distrust of punitive-damages
plaintiffs justifies a Restrictive Rule for corporate punitive damages,
we have equally good reason not to trust prosecutors either. If the
Holder-Thompson-McNulty memoranda are proper limits on federal
criminal liability, they should be codified so that other participants in
the criminal justice system besides prosecutors can assess whether
they apply to particular cases.
A final structural difference between criminal law and punitive
damages might favor Pennsylvania Schizophrenia: the fact that punitive damages are usually paid to victims, producing pressure for the
would
expansion of the availability of punitive damages where there
30 9
Victims
not be pressure for the expansion of criminal liability.
might argue that they are more worthy recipients of money flowing
from a Liberal Rule penalty than the state. This structural difference
might also be overstated. Criminal law can feature restitution orders
that compensate victims, and without requiring them to prosecute a
lawsuit themselves. 3 10 Those who are harmed by corporate misbehavior have, then, some incentive to push for expanded corporate criminal
liability as well as for expanded corporate punitive damages, and if
victims deserve a Liberal Rule for corporate punitive damages, they
also deserve a Liberal Rule for corporate crime when such restitution
orders might be at stake. Still, there may be a greater motive for an
307. Some states give judges discretion to reduce punitive awards as well as juries,
but this leeway is generally confined. See, e.g., Miss. Code Ann. § 11-165(1)(f(i)(West 1999) ("Before entering judgment for an award of punitive damages the trial court shall ascertain that the award is reasonable in its amount
and rationally related to the purpose to punish what occurred giving rise to the
award and to deter its repetition by the defendant and others.").
308. See Stuntz, supra note 306, at 509.
309. Some states have "split-recovery" statutes requiring in certain circumstances
that a portion of punitive awards go to the state and, except in Nebraska, at least
some of the money goes to the victim. See, e.g., Meredith Matheson Thoms, Punitive Damages in Texas: Examining the Need for a Split-Recovery Statute, 35 ST.
MARns L.J. 207, 211 (2003).
310. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B1.1(a)(1)(2006).
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expansion of punitive damages, since plaintiffs can recover the entire
amount that a fact-finder finds appropriate to deter a corporate
wrongdoer, rather than merely the limited amount available from a
restitution order.
However, the tendency to use punishment as a means of compensating victims, rather than expressing blame for culpable conduct, is
an abuse of the system of punitive damages. As noted above, the pur31 1
pose of punitive damages (except in Michigan and New Hampshire)
is deterrence and retribution, not compensation. Pursuing a secret
goal of compensation under the guise of these goals is improper. The
Supreme Court has said that "[d]ue process does not permit courts, in
the calculation of punitive damages, to adjudicate the merits of other
parties' hypothetical claims against a defendant under the guise of the
reprehensibility analysis."31 2 It is likewise improper for courts to promote compensation under the guise of retribution or deterrence.
In short, the existence of plaintiffs with a vested interest in the
expansion of the law of punitive damages may give an explanation,
but not a justification, for Pennsylvania Schizophrenia. If the arguments that civil plaintiffs give for a Liberal Rule are good ones, then
they would be just as good when made by prosecutors.
V.

CONCLUSION

Courts and legislatures have struggled with whether and how to
recognize a rogue-employee defense to criminal liability or to punitive
damages. Some states in both fields recognize such a defense, but
others do not. These states, however, do not match up. There is no
good reason for criminal law and punitive damages to punish corporations using different rules. Both fields pursue the same retributive
and deterrent functions; the same arguments are offered in favor of
each sort of rule in both fields; both fields require the same culpable
mental state for punishment; both fields specify what duty corporations have, as corporations, to stop employee misconduct; and both
fields aim to track blameworthiness. Alternative explanations for the
divergence of approaches are not compelling. Many sorts of litigants
would profit by pointing out the discrepancy to courts when rules are
uncertain or are being reconsidered. Courts assessing either corporate criminal liability or the assessment of punitive damages against a
corporation would be well-served to consider both fields at once.

311. Because of this idiosyncratic characterization of punitive damages, Michigan's
case of Pennsylvania Schizophrenia is less pathological than other states'. See
supra note 251.
312. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 423 (2003).

